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Abstract 
 
The following dissertation contains two distinct empirical essays which contribute to the overall 
field of Financial Economics. Chapter 1, entitled “Financial Inclusion and Economic Development 
in OIC Member Countries,” examines whether the presence of Islamic finance promotes 
development and alleviates poverty. To do so, we estimate the influence of financial inclusion 
variables on development and poverty variables for OIC countries. Using data from the World 
Bank, we use dynamic panel analysis using methodology similar to Beck et al (2000) to study the 
effects of financial inclusion on economic development and use simple cross-sectional analysis 
similar to Beck et al (2004) to study the effects on poverty alleviation. We find that the countries 
with Islamic finance tend to outperform the rest of the world. We believe that the ability of 
financial institutions offering Shari’a compliant services to bring otherwise excluded people under 
the financial system plays a major role in increased development and reduced poverty in those 
countries. The results support our view that financial inclusion is causing development. Chapter 2 
entitled, “Asymmetric Market Reactions to the 2007-08 Financial Crisis: From Wall Street to Main 
Street,” examines the impact of significant news events during the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis on 
the abnormal stock returns for portfolios of financial and real sector firms. We recognize 17 
significant news events from 2007 and 2008 and create equity portfolios using daily CRSP data 
from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2009. We estimate event announcement interval abnormal 
returns in the context of an asset pricing model similar to Fama and French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997). We document significant negative abnormal returns for the portfolio of non-financial 
firms, and the smallest firms exhibit the largest negative abnormal returns, an indication of a 
significant spillover of financial market news to real sector stock returns. Smaller financial firms 
also exhibit negative abnormal event returns, and these results are driven by broker-dealer, 
depository, holding-investment, and real estate firms. The results provide new evidence regarding 
the incorporation of news events into asset prices during financial crises.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Islamic banking, Financial inclusion, Economic development, Poverty, Financial crisis, 
Abnormal returns, Financial institutions 
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Chapter 1: Financial Inclusion and Economic Development in OIC Member Countries 
1. Introduction 
The financial system offers savings, credit, and risk management to individuals in a country. 
Inclusive financial services are more beneficial for poorer individuals increasing their ability to 
borrow and save money for education, investing in a business, making a large purchase, or health 
emergencies. An account provides a reliable place to save or to receive payments from family 
members, employers or the government. Without an account individuals have to rely on their own 
limited earnings and savings, which may contribute to persistent income inequality and slower 
economic growth. This topic has become a growing interest for researchers and policy makers. 
Involuntary financial exclusion can be problematic and needs policy action to remedy when there 
are individuals whose marginal benefit from using financial services are greater than the marginal 
costs, but are excluded by barriers. Evidence from international research efforts has revealed that 
there is a relationship between levels of financial exclusion and economic growth or poverty.  
Having an account increases savings, female empowerment, consumption, and investment of 
entrepreneurs. However, people in countries with low levels of financial inclusion struggle with 
financial problems due to the unavailability of financial services. Researchers and policymakers 
use financial inclusion strategies to increase the number of individuals, households and small and 
medium size enterprises that are now either fully or partially excluded from financial industry into 
the financial system. As people become more financially included, they gain power to use financial 
services to improve their life and that of their families.  
There are almost 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, making up about 24% of the world’s 
population. Many of whom are voluntarily excluded from the financial system, since the current 
financial system goes against the system of Islamic religious rules known as the Shari’a. In recent 
years, there has been an increase in Shari’a compliant financial products and insurances, which 
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plays a significant role in increasing the level of financial inclusion of Islamic countries. Increasing 
access to formal financial services in these countries will give the adults more ways to save and 
invest, which may help with economic growth in that country. According to Naceur, Bajaras and 
Massara (2015) only 27 percent of OIC households have an account at a formal institution, which 
compared to the rest of the world at 55 percent, is very low. Voluntary exclusion due to religious 
reason may in large part explain this disparity and increasing Islamic finance in this region may 
lead to increased economic growth and help alleviate poverty.  
The results of this research into the financial inclusion in the members of the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have importance for multiple reasons. First, researching Islamic 
countries will provide useful information about the relationship between financial inclusion and 
economic growth as well as poverty reduction. The demand for Shari’a compliant financial 
services is expected to increase and this information will be useful to provide desired financial 
products. Secondly, Shari’a compliant financial products have relatively low speculative 
characteristics compared to conventional financial services, and therefore has attracted a lot of 
attention in recent years, and these products have sufficient development potential.  Poverty is an 
ongoing problem across many countries that are members of the OIC and studying variables that 
affect financial inclusion may help policymakers include more people in the financial system that 
are being excluded which may help reduce poverty.  
Researchers have argued that the presence of Islamic finance promotes higher financial 
inclusion by attracting voluntarily excluded people to the financial system, thereby promoting 
growth in the country and reducing poverty (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2004). We 
empirically study whether the presence of Islamic finance in a country promotes higher growth 
and lowers poverty. Positive impact of financial inclusion on growth is already established in the 
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literature (see among other Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000)). We contribute to the literature by 
presenting proof that Islamic finance leaves positive impact on an economy. We also use a few 
superior econometric techniques, which have not been used in this field of study so far.   
Our major questions for the OIC countries are: does financial inclusion by Shari'a-
complaint financial systems have a stronger impact on economic growth and does it also reduce 
poverty more effectively? This study examines the influence of financial inclusion upon the 
diffusion of Shari'a-complaint financial systems on economic development by estimating the 
dynamic relationship between financial inclusion and economic growth as well as poverty. We 
compare the effects of financial inclusion on development between countries with Islamic finance 
and countries without Islamic finance examining the dynamic relationship between financial 
inclusion and economic development and poverty variables using the panel data. For that purpose 
we divide our sample in four categories: the whole world, OIC countries, OIC countries with 
Islamic finance, and OIC countries without Islamic finance (following Naceur, Barajas, and 
Massara (2015)).  
The procedure of this study is organized as follows: following Beck, Levine and Loayza 
(2000) we begin by selecting proxy variables for financial inclusion, economic development and 
poverty in OIC countries, and implement dynamic panel data analysis for separate classifications. 
We expect that we can take a closer look at the influence of financial inclusion on economic 
development and poverty in OIC countries. Second, in order to explore the dynamic relationship 
of proxy variables, we examine impulse response functions (IRFs) and forecast error variance 
decompositions (FEVDs) of panel vector autoregressive (VAR) methodologies. By using this 
approach, it is expected that we can examine the overall relationships of variables and can draw 
information that is more meaningful by comparing the results from the dynamic panel data 
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analysis. We find that one of our proxy variables for financial inclusion, private credit growth, has 
a positive and significant relationship with economic growth. The effect is higher for OIC countries 
and in some cases for OIC countries offering Islamic finance. Usually, small businesses are able 
to generate more value per unit of investment. So, we interpret the higher numbers for OIC 
countries as inclusion of small investors and households who were able to get small amounts of 
credit. This implies that Islamic banks are extending private credit to otherwise excluded 
(voluntary, or involuntary) people in OIC countries helping the economy grow. However, our other 
financial inclusion proxies do not produce significant results. Third, we analyze panel Granger 
causality tests in order to examine the direction of the variables, thus we can observe whether there 
is a causal relationship between financial inclusion, economic development and poverty in OIC 
countries. The panel Granger causality tests help us see that there are several variables that cause 
each other, for example we find that financial development influences all the inclusion variables. 
However, the relationship is not one-way. We also see that financial deposits cause development. 
The positive impact is more pronounced for the countries with Islamic finance than the whole 
sample. Researching how different factors affect financial inclusion in OIC countries we can 
expand the financial system to include those left out. Policy makers can see what reasons people 
give as to why they do not have accounts, or how they can change some policies to reduce costs 
to individuals, so that they can save more and in turn reduce poverty and stimulate economic 
growth. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 is Literature Review, Section 3 goes 
over the data we used, Section 4 goes over the methodology and results of our economic growth 
analysis, Section 5 talks about the methodology and results of our poverty analysis, Section 6 
concludes.  
5 
 
2. Literature Review 
Study  Sample Major Objectives Findings  
Standing Committee 
for Economic and 
Commercial 
Cooperation of the 
Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation 
(COMEC, 2014) 
 
 
 Explaining demand side 
and supply side factors to 
financial exclusion. 
Demand side reasons include the lack of financial literacy 
and inadequate client protection regulations. Religious 
constraints and cultural characteristics are other reasons of 
voluntary financial exclusion. 
Supply side reasons include the suppliers’ service quality, 
price and accessibility. 
Demirguc-Kunt and 
Klapper (2012, 2013) 
World Financial 
Index Database 
(Findex), they 
survey entire 
population in 
2011.   
Looking for variables that 
affect financial inclusion 
around the world.  
They find that 50 percent of the world’s adults have an 
account, and that account penetration differs largely between 
high-income and developing countries. Their results indicate 
that national-level financial development, measured by 
domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP, is 
also significantly associated with account penetration. 
Allen et al. (2012)  They look at the individual 
and country characteristics 
associated with the use of 
formal accounts and what 
policies are effective 
among those most likely to 
be excluded: the poor and 
rural residents. 
They found that lowering account costs and smaller distance 
to financial intermediaries increases ownership and use of 
accounts. Policies targeted to promote inclusion, such as 
requiring banks to offer basic or low-fee accounts, exempting 
some depositors from tedious documentation requirements, 
allowing correspondent banking, and using bank accounts to 
make government payments, may be especially effective 
among those most likely to be excluded. Policies to reduce 
barriers to financial inclusion may expand the number of 
account users and encourage existing account holders to use 
their accounts more frequently and increase saving.  
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Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2009) 
 This paper criticizes 
financial and economic 
theories of financial 
inequality. 
Finance plays a crucial role in most theories of persistent 
inequality. Therefore, economic theory provides a rich set of 
predictions concerning both the impact of finance on 
inequality and about the relevant mechanisms. Most of the 
previous empirical research suggests that improvements in 
financial contracts, markets, and intermediaries expand 
economic opportunities and reduce inequality. Yet, there is a 
shortage of theoretical and empirical research on the impact 
of formal financial sector policies, such as bank regulations 
and securities law, on persistent inequality.  
Demirguc-Kunt et al 
(2013a 
The authors 
restrict their data 
to include 65,000 
adults in 64 
countries. 
This study looks at Islamic 
finance and its influence 
on financial inclusion. 
They find that Muslims are significantly less likely than non-
Muslims to own a formal account or save at a formal 
financial institution. However they do not find any evidence 
that Muslims are less likely than non-Muslims to report 
formal or informal borrowing. They then look more closely 
at North African and Middle Eastern countries and find that 
there is little use of Shari’a-compliant banking products even 
though they find evidence of a hypothetical preference for 
Shari’a-compliant products among the respondents despite 
higher costs.  
Demirguc-Kunt et al 
(2013b) 
World Financial 
Index Database 
(2011) 
This study looks at the 
gender differences in the 
use of financial services in 
developing countries. 
They find that there are significant gender gaps in account 
ownership and usage of savings and credit services. The 
authors find that legal discrimination against women and 
gender norms explains some of the variation in account 
ownership. In countries where women do not have equal 
rights in their ability to work, head a household, choose 
where to live, or receive inheritance women are less likely to 
own an account, save and borrow. Violence against women 
and early marriage also contribute to the difference in use of 
financial services.  
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Anson et al (2013) Global Findex 
includes data from 
60 countries 
where postal 
accounts are 
offered. 
They study the role of the 
post office in financial 
inclusion. 
The paper finds that post offices are relatively more likely 
than traditional financial institutions to provide accounts to 
individuals who are most likely to be from financially 
vulnerable groups, such as the poor, less educated, and those 
out of the labor force. They also find that post offices can 
boost account ownership by acting as cash-merchants for 
transactional financial services, such as electronic 
government and remittance payments, and that partnerships 
between the post office and other financial institutions 
coincide with a higher bank account penetration.  
Hannig and Jansen 
(2010) 
 They suggest that 
greater financial inclusion 
may 
enhance financial stability. 
The recent financial crisis has shown that financial 
innovation can have devastating systemic impacts. They 
state that low-income savers and borrowers tend to maintain 
solid financial behavior throughout financial crises, keeping 
deposits in a safe place and paying back their loans. The 
potential costs of financial inclusion are compensated for by 
important dynamic benefits that enhance financial stability 
over time through a deeper and more diversified financial 
system.  
Naceur, Bajaras and 
Massara (2015) 
 This paper looks at the 
relationship between the 
development of Islamic 
banking and financial 
inclusion. 
In OIC countries, many financial inclusion indicators tend to 
be lower, and the percentage of citing religious reasons for 
not using bank accounts is far greater than in other countries; 
Islamic banking would therefore seem to be an effective 
opportunity for financial inclusion. Their results show that 
although physical access to financial services has grown 
more rapidly in the OIC countries, the use of these services 
has not increased as quickly. They find a positive but weak 
relationship between credit to households and to firms for 
financing investment. 
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We expand on previous literature to include how financial inclusion by Shari’a compliant 
financial systems have a greater impact on economic growth in OIC countries, and how it may 
help alleviate poverty. Many individuals in these areas choose not to use conventional banking in 
these areas due to religious reason and this study intends to show that there is a need to expand 
Islamic banking in these areas.  
3. Data 
This study will explore the relationship between the financial inclusion, economic growth 
and poverty of OIC countries since they have higher levels of voluntary financial exclusion relative 
to other countries. We will examine the relationship between economic growth and financial 
inclusion, which is growing proportionally with the development of Islamic financial systems. We 
will also examine the relationship between poverty and financial inclusion. The OIC consists of 
57 countries.  We use similar methodology to Hassan et al (2014) and Beck et al (2000) to explore 
this relationship.  
Since OIC countries are located in a variety of geographical regions, such as Europe, the 
Middle East, Asia, and Africa, there must be many regional differences so we will divide the data 
by geographical regions. We will use the World Bank regional classifications to do so which will 
allow us to consider both the heterogeneity across regions and the homogeneity of similar 
geographic regions. 
We used three different databases available via the World Bank; Global Financial Index 
(Findex) database, Global Financial Development database (GFDD), and the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database. Our sample period covers the years 1990 through 2014.  
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4.  Methodology and Empirical Findings for Economic Development Analysis 
4.1 Proxy measures for financial inclusion and economic development 
Financial inclusion by definition is the measure of how many individuals and firms use 
financial services, the key factors to measure financial inclusion are financial service usage 
statistics such as accounts penetration, savings, credit, insurance, etc. (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Klapper, 2012).  Previous studies of financial inclusion have used the number of accounts at formal 
financial institutions, the number of loans from a formal institution, the use of ATMs, credit and 
debit card usage, etc. as proxy variables for financial inclusion. We will use Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth rate, which is transformed with the log differencing of GDP (currently in 
USD)1 as a proxy variable for economic growth. We will use the level of income as a proxy for 
poverty. We also utilize the following variables in Table A to measure key factors of financial 
inclusion: 
Table A 
Economic Variables that Affect Financial 
Inclusion 
Definition  
Private credit by deposit money banks to 
GDP (%) 
 
 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP, calculated using 
the following deflation method:  {(0.5)*[Ft/Pet + 
Ft-1/Pet-1]}/[GDPt/Pat] where F is credit to the 
private sector, Pe is end-of period CPI, and Pa is 
average annual CPI.  
Financial system deposits to GDP (%) Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions as a 
share of GDP, calculated using the following 
deflation method:  {(0.5: {(0.5)*[Ft/Pet + Ft-1/Pet-
1]}/[GDPt/Pat] where F is demand and time and 
saving deposits, Pe is end-of period CPI, and Pa 
is average annual CPI. 
  
                                                          
1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 = ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡) − ln⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1) 
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Life insurance premium volume to GDP (%) 
+Nonlife insurance premium volume to GDP 
(%) 
Ratio of life insurance premium volume to GDP 
(Premium volume is the insurer's direct 
premiums earned (if Property/Casualty) or 
received (if Life/Health) during the previous 
calendar year) + ratio of non-life insurance 
premium volume to GDP (Premium volume is the 
insurer's direct premiums earned (if 
Property/Casualty) or received (if Life/Health) 
during the previous calendar year). 
 
In this study we are trying to evaluate the impact of financial intermediaries (inclusion) on 
growth and the sources of growth. In order to evaluate the impact we look for an indicator of the 
ability of financial intermediaries to research and identify profitable projects, monitor and control 
managers, ease risk management, and enable capital mobilization. We do not have a direct measure 
of these financial services. Therefore, we must use proxies for financial inclusion. Following Beck 
et al (2000) the primary measure of financial inclusion we use is a variable called Private Credit, 
which equals the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. 
This variable excludes credits issued by central banks and development banks, and only includes 
private credits issued deposit money banks and other financial intermediaries. We also use 
financial system deposits, and we add the life and non-life insurance premiums for a total insurance 
premium as a last measure of financial inclusion. This data is already deflated in the World Bank 
database as stated in the variable description and therefore should not produce misleading 
measures of financial inclusion, especially in highly inflationary environments.  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
We divide our sample similar to how Naceur, Bajaras and Massara (2015) did in their paper 
to see the differences between the groups. The data is divided in to four groups, the whole world, 
OIC countries, OIC countries that use Islamic banking and OIC countries that do not use Islamic 
banking. The OIC countries we included in our sample are listed in Table 1.1 and divided in to the 
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subgroups depending on their use of Islamic finance. At first we look at the summary statistics. 
We only have 45 observations from OIC countries and the sample gets smaller as we subdivide. 
We construct a panel dataset with data averaged over each of the six 3-year periods between 1990 
and 2013. 
Table 1.1: Country Groups 
OIC Countries with Islamic Banking (ISB) OIC Countries 
without ISB 
Afghanistan Mauritania Benin 
Albania Nigeria Chad 
Algeria Oman Comoros 
Azerbaijan Pakistan Gabon 
Bahrain Qatar Guinea 
Bangladesh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Guinea-Bissau 
Brunei Senegal Guyana 
Burkina Faso Sudan Kazakhstan 
Cameroon Syrian Arab Republic Kyrgyz Republic 
Cote d’Ivoire Tunisia Libya 
Djibouti Turkey Mali 
Arab Republic of Egypt Uganda Morocco 
Gambia United Arab Emirates Mozambique 
Indonesia West Bank & Gaza Niger 
Islamic Republic of Iran Republic of Yemen Sierra Leone 
Iraq  Somalia 
Jordan  Suriname 
Kuwait  Tajikistan 
Lebanon  Togo 
Malaysia  Turkmenistan 
Maldives  Uzbekistan 
   
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics of the means and medians of the various dependent 
and independent variables we are studying. From this table we can see that for most variables the 
variance between the mean and median decreases between OIC countries, and then OIC countries 
with Islamic banking and without. We also see that when comparing the OIC countries with 
Islamic banking to OIC countries without Islamic banking, the ones with Islamic countries fare 
better. 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics    
This table shows the summary statistics 
  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB  
Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med 
         
GDP per capita 11554.83 4349.115 5342.226 1182.52 7333.945 1810.31 1981.199 604.015 
         
Private credit 5644.347 964.3932 2233.721 261.4743 3300.525 315.4304 300.1392 68.04745 
         
Financial 
Deposits 
6108.904 1134.39 2929.483 339.5616 4305.01 631.2542 436.3394 83.5733 
         
Insurance 
Premium 
458.2061 52.27769 64.56178 12.43786 90.0759 15.19793 18.31743 3.089838 
         
Growth of GDP 
per capita 
0.0161675 0.0197618 0.0186435 0.0266313 0.0182658 0.0246127 0.0192808 0.0279138 
         
Growth of 
Private Credit 
0.0567007 0.0466234 0.042967 0.0379467 0.0459025 0.0432501 0.0376464 0.0364992 
         
Growth of 
Financial 
Deposits 
0.0531059 0.0472275 0.0494763 0.0439184 0.042777 0.0439184 0.0616187 0.0382181 
         
Growth of 
Insurance 
Premium 
0.0335451 0.0320496 0.0145349 0.0190314 0.0247138 0.0190314 -0.0039144 0.0174735 
     
Number of obs 158 45 29 16 
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We see that there are great discrepancies between the different categories, for example, the GDP 
per capita mean differs greatly from the world which is 11,554 USD to the OIC member countries 
mean of 5,342 USD. When we divide the OIC countries in to subcategories, the OIC with Islamic 
banking has a mean of 7,333 USD whereas without Islamic banking has a mean of 1,981 USD. 
These large discrepancies may be due to any number of socio-economic, or political reasons but it 
is still interesting to see these differences and are prevalent in almost all the variables labeled in 
Table 1.2. We continue our investigation further to see how many of these differences may be able 
to be overcome.  
4.3 Cross Country Regression with Instrumental Variables  
In the pure cross-sectional analysis we use data averaged for the countries in each group 
over 1990-2013. Such that, there is one observation per country. The basic regression takes the 
form 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽⁡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
Where Y is growth (GDP), Inclusion includes private credit and financial deposit, X 
represents a vector of conditioning information that controls for other factors associated with 
economic growth (insurance premium), and e is the error term. These variables are normalized 
using logarithm. Panel B of Table 1.3, uses the same basic regression but instead of the natural log 
of the averaged values we look at the growth of each variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Table 1.3: GMM regression on GDP per capita and the growth of GDP per capita  
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to a GMM regression of each financial access or depth variable on 
the different country subgroups. Significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 
percent (***) are also indicated. In the cross-country regressions in the left-hand portion of the 
table, each dependent variable is evaluated as an average for every three year period over 
1990-2013. 
Panel A: GDP per Capita 
Variable World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
Private credit 1.448067*** 2.533751*** 2.532039*** 5.398959***  
(12.5) (20.02) (19.94) (5.75) 
Financial Deposits 1.531709*** 2.033711*** 2.00129*** 3.773944***  
(11.48) (8.28) (7.96) (7.85) 
Panel B: Growth of GDP per Capita 
Variable World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
Growth of Private credit 0.3981974*** 0.2739034*** 0.3219448*** 0.1662368  
(15.56) (5.21) (4.41) (2.29) 
Growth of financial 
deposit 
0.3786112*** 0.2351243*** 0.3396295*** 0.1024002** 
 
(13.13) (5.14) (6.27) (1.96) 
 
Looking at the results of Table 1.3 Panel A, the proxies we used for financial inclusion for 
economic growth are all correlation significantly with economic growth across all categories.  We 
see that private credit and GDP per capita are positively and significantly correlated across all 
subgroups, therefore, increasing private credit will increase GDP per capita. The same inference 
can be made for the relationship between financial deposits and GDP per capita. In Panel B of the 
same table, we look at the relationship of GDP growth with the growth of our proxy variables for 
financial inclusion and find that growth of private credit is positively and significantly correlated 
with GDP growth for OIC countries and OIC countries with Islamic banking, this implies that 
increasing private credit in OIC countries with Islamic banking will increase economic growth 
even more. The growth of financial deposits is positively and significantly correlated to GDP 
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growth for OIC countries, OIC countries with Islamic countries and OIC countries without Islamic 
banking, this implies that increase financial deposits in the OIC region will increase GDP growth.  
The results of Panel B shows that Islamic banking can help economic development.   
4.4 Dynamic Panel Estimation of Transformed data  
In our dataset some of the observations are extreme and therefore transformation 
smoothens the dataset. Beck et al (2000) follows a similar technique in their study. They smooth 
their data for five-year periods. However, our main focus in this study are developing or 
underdeveloped countries which have many missing variables before 1990. Considering the much 
smaller timespan of our data we smooth our data over three-year periods. Given that we are using 
3-year periods, the forecasting horizon for the growth innovation, that is, its unanticipated 
component, extends about three years into the future.  
The cross-country estimations help us determine whether the cross-country variable in 
economic growth can be explained by variance in the exogenous component of financial inclusion. 
There are some limitations with pure cross-sectional instrumental variable estimator. Therefore 
using panel techniques may help with these issues.  First, besides the cross-country variance, we 
also would like to know whether changes in financial development over time within a country have 
an effect on economic growth through its various channels. By using a panel data set, we gain 
degrees of freedom by adding the variability of the time-series dimension. It also allows us to 
exploit substantial additional variability. 
Our panels were divided into the different subgroups over the period 1990-2013. Many 
countries were dropped due to the lack of data. We average the data over 6 non-overlapping 3-year 
periods. The regression equation can be specified as follows:  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼
′𝑋1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (2) 
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where y represents our dependent variable, X1 represents a set of lagged explanatory 
variables, and X2 represents a set of contemporaneous explanatory variables, µ is an unobserved 
country-specific effect, λ is a time-specific effect, ε is the time-varying error term, and i and t 
represent country and 3-year time period, respectively.  
For estimating panel data, if the dependence variable has a serial auto-correlation, the 
regression with the lagged dependent variables as independent variables can reduce the serial auto-
correlation of an error term. When dealing with panel data, a similar approach can be adopted that 
considers the auto correlation of the dependent variable, however, the estimation will be biased 
because of the correlation between the lagged dependent variables and the error term. To handle 
this issue, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested a generalized method of moments (GMM) method 
that estimated a dynamic panel model, which can remove the auto correlation of the error term and 
reduce the correlation between endogenous variables and the error term. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggests to first-difference the regression equation to eliminate 
the country-specific effect, as follows: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼
′(𝑋1𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑋
1
𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽
′(𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋
2
𝑖,𝑡−1) + (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 −⁡𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1)     (3) 
This procedure solves the first econometric problem, but introduces a correlation between the new 
error term, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 −⁡𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1, and the lagged dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2, when it is included in 
𝑋1𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑋
1
𝑖,𝑡−2. To address this correlation and endogeneity problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
propose using the lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels as instruments. Under the 
assumptions that there is no serial in the error term, ε, and that the explanatory variables X, where 
X=[X1X2], are weakly exogenous, we can use the following moment conditions: 
𝐸[(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑠(𝜀𝑖,𝑡 −⁡𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1))] = 0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠 ≥ 2; 𝑡 = 3, … . , 𝑇.⁡ (4) 
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Table 1.4: One-step estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991)  
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to a one-step estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) regression of 
each financial access or depth variable on the different country subgroups. We are not 
assuming homoskedastic error term. Significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 
1 percent (***) are also indicated. The variables in Panel A are normalized using logarithm. 
In the cross-country regressions in the left-hand portion of the table, each dependent variable 
is evaluated as an average for every three year period over 1990-2013.  
Panel A: Logarithmic Normal GDP per Capita 
Variable World OIC OIC w ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP(t-1) 0.4833413*** 0.342608** 0.3864354** 0.281021  
(7.56) (2.11) (2.16) (1.44) 
Private credit 0.0738162** 0.067773 0.0733849 0.0077065  
(3.01) (1.62) (1.59) (0.09) 
Financial deposit 0.0174615 0.1537017 0.0765998 0.2297937  
(0.68) (1.35) (0.54) (1.23) 
Insurance premium 0.1306594*** 0.0788955 0.1696078** 0.035003  
(6.70) (1.44) (2.41) (0.88) 
Constant 3.119995*** 3.347337*** 3.264903*** 3.658337***  
(8.13) (5.37) (5.76) (4.25) 
Number of Obs 454 110 78 32 
Panel B: GDP per capita Growth 
Variable World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP growth(t-1) 0.0380665 0.3190367** 0.1355443 0.1060055  
(0.52) (2.43) (0.75) (0.86) 
Private Credit growth 0.1149442*** 0.1629874*** 0.1583385** 0.1382548**  
(6.7) (2.56) (1.96) (2.02) 
Financial Deposit 
deposits 
0.0079107 -0.1799248 -0.1601209 -0.0667024 
 
(1.29) (-1.27) (-0.77) (-0.92) 
Insurance premium 
growth 
0.0668688** 0.1510212** 0.1132784 0.085385*** 
 
(2.31) (2.01) (0.83) (2.94) 
Constant 0.0144444*** 0.0131772 0.0185722*** 0.0122033*  
(4.91) (1.61) (2.96) (1.70) 
Number of Obs 454 110 78 32 
 
We first test for autocorrelation and reject our null of no autocorrelation in the first 
differenced errors at 10% level. In Table 1.4 Panel A, we see that previous period GDP (GDPt-1) 
is positively and significantly correlated with GDP per capita, this implies that last periods GDP 
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is correlated with this period’s GDP. The sample for OIC countries with no Islamic banking is so 
small that most tests do not yield significant results. In this panel we also see that Insurance 
premium has a positive and significant correlation with GDP per capita for both the world and for 
OIC countries with Islamic banking. In Panel B of the same table, we can see that private credit 
growth is positively and significantly correlated with GDP growth for all categories. And 
insurance premium growth is positively and significantly correlated to GDP growth for all 
categories except OIC countries with Islamic banking. We cannot make any inferences about 
Islamic banking from this Panel B but Panel A shows promising results for Islamic banking.   
There are some issues by first-differencing. We lose the pure cross-country dimension of 
the data. Second, differencing may decrease the signal-to-noise ratio, thereby exacerbating 
measurement error biases. Also, Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond 
(1997) show that if the lagged dependent and the explanatory variables are persistent over time, 
lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regressions in differences. Simulation 
studies show that the difference estimator has a large finite-sample bias and poor precision. 
Therefore, to deal with these issues we use an alternative method that estimates the regression in 
differences jointly with the regression in levels, as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). Using 
Monte Carlo experiments, Blundell and Bond (1997) show that this system estimator reduces the 
potential biases in finite samples and asymptotic imprecision associated with the difference 
estimator.  
According to Beck et al (2000) the key reason for this improvement is the inclusion of the 
regression in levels, which does not eliminate cross-country variation or intensify the strength of 
measurement error. Furthermore, the variables in levels maintain a stronger correlation with their 
instruments, as explained below, than the variables in differences, particularly as variables in levels 
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are more serially correlated than in differences. However, being able to use the regression in levels 
comes at the cost of requiring an additional assumption. This requirement occurs because the 
regression in levels does not directly eliminate the country-specific effect. Instead, appropriate 
instruments must be used to control for country-specific effects. The estimator uses lagged 
differences of the explanatory variables as instruments. They are valid instruments under the 
assumption that the correlation between l and the levels of the explanatory variables is constant 
over time, such that  
𝐸[𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝑝𝜇𝑖] = ⁡𝐸[𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝑞𝜇𝑖]⁡for all p and q. (5) 
Under this assumption, there is no correlation between the differences of the explanatory variables 
and the country-specific effect. For example, this assumption implies that financial inclusion may 
be correlated with the country-specific effect, but this correlation does not change through time. 
Thus, under this assumption, lagged differences are valid instruments for the regression in levels, 
and the moment conditions for the regressions in levels are as follows: 
𝐸[(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑠−⁡𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑠−1)⁡(𝜀𝑖,𝑡 +⁡𝜇𝑖))] = 0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠 = 1; 𝑡 = 3,… . , 𝑇. (6) 
When we conduct the two-step estimator with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust VCE we 
get similar results.  In Table 1.5 Panel A, the variables are normalized using logarithm. The results 
in this panel show that GDPt-1 is positively and significantly correlated to GDP across all 
categories except OIC countries with no Islamic banking. The coefficient for OIC countries with 
Islamic banking (.4526937) is the highest amongst the categories showing that Islamic banking 
has a stronger correlation with GDP growth. We also see that insurance premium has a positive 
and significant correlation with GDP for the world and OIC countries with Islamic banking. The 
coefficient for OIC countries with Islamic banking (.1795919) is greater than the coefficient for 
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the world (.1285623), this indicates that Islamic finance may increase the amount of insurance 
premium greater than conventional banking.  
In Panel B, we find that private credit growth is positively and significantly correlated to 
GDP growth across all categories. The coefficient for OIC countries with Islamic banking is the 
highest (.1755136) indicating that it has the highest correlation with GDP growth. The other 
variables are insignificant, this indicates that increasing private credit growth helps with economic 
development, however, Islamic banking may not necessarily make a difference.  
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Table 1.5: A two-step estimator with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust VCE  
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to a two-step estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) regression 
with Windmeijer bias corrected robust VCE of each financial access or depth variable on the 
different country subgroups. Significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent 
(***) are also indicated. The variables in Panel A are normalized using logarithm. In the cross-
country regressions in the left-hand portion of the table, each dependent variable is evaluated 
as an average for every three year period over 1990-2013. 
Panel A: GDP per Capita 
 
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP(t-1) 0.3701538*** 0.4189563*** 0.4526937*** 0.3416179  
(3.97) (2.71) (3.69) (0.07) 
Private credit 0.0933789*** 0.0657183 0.0745181 0.0664196  
(2.56) (1.42) (1.22) (0.04) 
Financial deposit 0.0228976 0.0893011 0.0147499 0.120207  
(0.41) (0.63) (0.13) (0.05) 
Insurance premium 0.1285623*** 0.1048327 0.1795919*** 0.0263911  
(4.64) (1.58) (3.63) (0.01) 
Constant 3.834359*** 3.012194*** 3.053495*** 3.349737  
(6.79) (5.44) (6.94) (0.13) 
Number of Obs 454 110 78 32 
Panel B: GDP per Capita Growth 
 
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP growth(t-1) 0.0379681 0.283067 0.0642162 0.091998  
(0.39) (1.57) (0.28) (0.44) 
Private credit growth 0.1045932*** 0.13559** 0.1755136** 0.1490604***  
(6.07) (2.05) (2.51) (2.76) 
Financial deposit 
growth 
0.0014505 -0.1066476 -0.1360692 -0.0474504 
 
(0.15) (-0.49) (-0.68) (-0.80) 
Insurance premium 
growth 
0.0890107 0.1364984 0.0800184 0.0895022 
 
(1.50) (1.40) (0.59) (1.54) 
Constant 0.0122836*** 0.0098502 0.0195817** 0.0023855  
(2.80) (1.11) (2.43) (0.27) 
Number of Obs 453 110 78 32 
 
The results of the one-step estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) regression are presented 
in Table 1.6.  The results in Panel A are similar to the previous results, where GDPt-1 is correlated 
to GDP for all categories except OIC countries without Islamic banking. We also find that private 
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credit is positively and significantly correlated to GDP for the world and OIC countries. We cannot 
conclude whether these correlations are stronger due to Islamic banking or not. In Panel B, we see 
better and more significant results. Private credit growth is positively and significantly correlated 
to GDP growth across all groups. The coefficient for OIC countries with Islamic banking 
(.1608909) is greater than the other coefficients, signifying that it is more strongly correlated to 
GDP growth, and therefore Islamic finance can be beneficial in increasing GDP growth even 
further.  Insurance premium growth is also positively and significantly correlated to GDP growth 
across all groups except OIC countries with Islamic banking.  
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Table 1.6: One-step estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) not assuming homoskedastic error 
term 
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to a one-step estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) regression of 
each financial access or depth variable on the different country subgroups. We are not assuming 
homoskedastic error term Significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent 
(***) are also indicated. The variables in Panel A are normalized using logarithm. In the cross-
country regressions in the left-hand portion of the table, each dependent variable is evaluated as 
an average for every three year period over 1990-2013. 
Panel A: GDP per Capita  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP(t-1) 0.5506868*** 0.7490871*** 0.6248235*** 0.8553244  
(6.22) (7.00) (3.56) (10.91) 
Private credit  0.0790888* 0.1744954* 0.1485452 0.1945388  
(1.94) (1.79) (1.25) (1.60) 
Financial deposit  0.0037956 -0.0927124 -0.1077349 -0.0925915  
(0.22) (-0.82) (-0.84) (-0.98) 
Insurance premium 0.1357285*** -0.0045981 0.1433709 -0.0564309  
(4.91) (-0.05) (1.23) (-1.01) 
Constant 2.602588*** 1.474334*** 2.277986*** 0.6788371  
(6.03) (3.21) (3.32) (1.74) 
Number of Obs 574 139 99 40 
Panel B: GDP per Capita Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP growth(t-1) 0.0921583 0.3462706*** 0.2512558 0.2594781***  
(1.62) (2.87) (1.06) (3.50) 
Private credit growth 0.1255999*** 0.1656607** 0.1608909* 0.1366351**  
(6.75) (2.51) (1.87) (2.16) 
Financial deposit growth 0.0097476 -0.1756344 -0.1604298 -0.0846551  
(1.28) (-1.11) (-0.68) (-1.40) 
Insurance premium growth 0.0689376** 0.1535817* 0.1386411 0.1266342***  
(2.33) (1.72) (0.90) (4.50) 
Constant 0.0122348*** 0.0120093** 0.0144873** 0.0096149**  
(5.15) (2.01) (2.52) (1.77) 
Number of Obs 573 139 99 40 
 
We then do a two-step estimator with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust VCE. The results 
of this regression are presented in Table 1.7. Panel A, shows that GDP(t-1) for the world, OIC 
countries and OIC countries with Islamic banking are all positive and significant. Private credit 
and insurance premium is also positive and significant for the world but not for the other 
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subgroups.  From Panel A we cannot make any conclusion about Islamic banking being better. 
Looking at the growth of the same variables in Panel B, GDP growth(t-1) is positive and significant 
for OIC countries and OIC countries without Islamic banking. We also find that private credit 
growth for OIC countries is also positive and significantly correlated to GDP growth as well as for 
OIC countries with Islamic banking. This results may indicate some preference for Islamic 
banking, however the other variables are inconclusive. Insurance premium growth is positive and 
significantly correlated to GDP growth for the world, OIC countries and OIC countries without 
Islamic banking.  
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Table 1.7: A two-step estimator with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust VCE 
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to a two-step estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) regression 
with Windmeijer bias corrected robust VCE of each financial access or depth variable on the 
different country subgroups. Significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent 
(***) are also indicated. The variables in Panel A are normalized using logarithm. In the cross-
country regressions in the left-hand portion of the table, each dependent variable is evaluated as 
an average for every three year period over 1990-2013. 
Panel A: GDP per capita  
World OIC whole OIC Islamic OIC non-
Islamic 
GDP(t-1) 0.5114023*** 0.7637287*** 0.6380059*** 0.796915  
(4.82) (6.76) (4.24) (0.63) 
Private credit 0.0870991** 0.1388783 0.1320848 0.154713  
(2.08) (1.37) (1.1) (0.24) 
Financial deposit 0.0058688 -0.0570806 -0.0906835 -0.0712696  
(0.17) (-0.46) (-0.85) (-0.06) 
Insurance premium 0.1325068*** -0.0169092 0.1184969 -0.0371378  
(3.83) (-0.17) (1.54) (-0.02) 
Constant 2.842381*** 1.377937*** 2.223892*** 1.078095  
(5.04) (3.07) (3.19) (0.14) 
Number of Obs 574 139 99 40 
Panel B: GDP per Capita Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP growth(t-1) 0.1499212 0.3414409*** 0.235832 0.3815464**  
(1.96) (2.88) (0.98) (2.34) 
Private credit growth 0.1117029 0.1212988** 0.1670115** 0.0896763  
(5.44) (2.07) (2.2) (0.89) 
Financial deposit growth 0.0033135 -0.1200763 -0.1579043 -0.0598815  
(0.26) (-0.8) (-0.72) (-0.66) 
Ins. premium growth 0.1177448** 0.1523254** 0.132466 0.1515774***  
(2.42) (1.96) (0.93) (5.57) 
Constant 0.0077825*** 0.0110387* 0.0148895*** 0.004765  
(2.82) (1.71) (2.57) (0.75) 
Number of Obs 573 139 99 40 
 
4.5 Dynamic Panel Estimation of non-Transformed Data 
In our next set of regressions we use non-transformed data and repeat the tests we 
conducted before. First we conduct the Arellano Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1999) test. 
We reject our null of no autocorrelation in the first differenced errors at the 10% level. In table 1.8 
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Panel A we regress GDP per capita against our proxy variables and also a one period lag of those 
variables, and a three period lag of GDP and in Panel B we regress the growth of the same 
variables. Our results, in Table 1.8 Panel A, indicate that GDP (t-1) for all subgroups is positive and 
significant, indicating that the current period GDP is related to last period’s GDP. GDP (t-2) is 
positive and significant for OIC countries and for OIC countries without Islamic banking. It is 
interesting to see that GDP (t-3) for the world is positive and significant for the world, however it is 
negative and significant for OIC countries and OIC countries without Islamic banking. Private 
credit for the current period, t, is positive and significant for the world, OIC countries and for OIC 
countries without Islamic banking. Private Credit (t-1) on the other had is negative and significant 
for the world, OIC countries, and for OIC countries without Islamic banking. Panel B, shows us 
that GDP growth (t-1) is significant for OIC countries with and without Islamic countries, however 
it is positive for OIC countries with Islamic countries and negative for OIC countries without 
Islamic banking.  Panel B shows that GDPgrowth (t-1) is negative and significant for OIC countries 
and OIC countries without Islamic banking.  Private Credit growtht is positive and significant for 
the world, OIC countries and OIC countries with Islamic banking.  This may indicate a positive 
facet of using Islamic banking.  
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Table 1.8: One-step estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) for non-transformed data  
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to a One-step estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) of each 
financial access or depth variable on the different country subgroups. We are not assuming 
homoskedastic error term. Significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent 
(***) are also indicated. The variables in Panel A are normalized using logarithm. In the cross-
country regressions in the left-hand portion of the table, each dependent variable is evaluated 
over 1990-2013. 
Panel A: GDP per Capita  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP (t-1) 0.6118871*** 0.4643959** 1.021504*** 0.3561427**  
(2.96) (2.4) (9.94) (2.31) 
GDP (t-2) 0.0824758 0.388776* -0.1031914 0.6945054***  
(0.59) (1.9) (-0.96) (2.88) 
GDP (t-3) 0.0618273** -0.1329119* -0.067272 -0.25479**  
(2.2) (-1.91) (-1.44) (-2.24) 
Private Creditt 0.0657614*** 0.0818454*** 0.0491252 0.0766525**  
(3.25) (2.84) (1.46) (2.12) 
Private Credit (t-1) -0.07138*** -0.0410152 -0.0608905** -0.0154008  
(-6.45) (-1.45) (-2.04) (-.31) 
Financial Depositst 0.0061666 -0.058164 -0.0012461 -0.0749061  
(0.51) (-1.17) (-0.03) (-1.17) 
Financial Deposits (t-1) 0.0445986*** 0.0583999 0.0481144 0.027319  
(2.56) (1.41) (1.18) (.34) 
Insurance premiumt 0.0675809** 0.1229508 0.0372441 0.1684373  
(2.3) (1.54) (1.17) (1.58) 
Insurance premium (t-1) -0.0039443 -0.0626745 0.0007884 -0.1025805*  
(-0.4) (-1.61) (0.03) (-1.67) 
Number of Obs 2239 580 396 184 
Panel B: GDP per Capita Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP growth (t-1) 0.0481295 -0.3209801 0.1934359* -0.5751084***  
(.35) (-1.36) (1.66) (-4.52) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.0068168 0.1467375 0.0003266 0.2667124*  
(-.21) (1.4) (.01) (1.66) 
GDP growth (t-3) 0.0204754 -0.0102016 -0.0771245 -0.0246647  
(.61) (-.18) (-1.41) (-.19) 
Private Credit growtht 0.0399737*** 0.1124262*** 0.0852201* 0.0741902  
(2.68) (3.42) (1.85) (1.57) 
Private Credit growth (t-1) -0.041564 -0.0185661 -0.0131792 -0.1072467  
(-3.48) (-.79) (-.49) (-1.29) 
Financial Depositst -0.009993 -0.1233693** -0.0479041 -0.0935055 
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(-.93) (-2.12) (-.79) (-1.43) 
Financial Deposits (t-1) 0.0493786*** 0.0447284 0.0369477 0.0935303  
(2.97) (1.47) (.99) (1.22) 
Ins. Premium growtht 0.0563684** 0.1155644* 0.0239276 0.1472185  
(2.02) (1.68) (.71) (1.63) 
Ins. Premium growth (t-1) 0.015319* 0.0151406 -0.0095902 0.0399444*  
(1.74) (.67) (-.48) (1.77) 
Number of Obs 2015 536 368 168 
 
For Table 1.9, we repeat the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1999) 
estimators. We regress GDP per capita against 3 period lags of itself as well as against our proxy 
variables of financial inclusion. In Panel A we find that for the non-transformed data, GDP (t-1) is 
positive and significantly correlated to GDP per capita across all categories. GDP(t-3) is negatively 
and significantly correlated to GDP per capita for the world, OIC countries and OIC countries 
with Islamic banking. This shows that if GDP per capita increases this year, three years from now 
the GDP will decrease. Private credit is also negative and significantly correlated to GDP per 
capita for the world and for OIC countries with Islamic banking. This result is different from our 
previous results which found a positive correlation between the two variables. In Panel B, GDP 
Growth (t-1) is negative and significant for OIC countries and for OIC countries without Islamic 
banking. Private credit growth is positive and significant for the world, OIC countries and OIC 
countries with Islamic banking. We cannot draw any inferences about Islamic banking from this 
table.  
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Table 1.9: Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond system estimator 
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to an Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond system estimator 
of each financial access or depth variable on the different country subgroups. Significance levels 
of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***) are also indicated. The variables in Panel A 
are normalized using logarithm. In the cross-country regressions in the left-hand portion of the 
table, each dependent variable is evaluated over 1990-2013. 
Panel A: GDP per Capita 
 
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP (t-1) 0.943474*** 0.621765** 1.224554*** 0.4445286*  
3.62 2.22 10.79 1.89 
GDP (t-2) 0.0981844 0.5899437* -0.1852345 0.7675793**  
.34 1.69 -1.55 2.08 
GDP (t-3) -0.141766* -0.3148939** -0.0975485** -0.2653401  
-1.81 -2.27 -2.03 -1.57 
Private Credit -0.0152611* -0.0304785 -0.0224611*** 0.0245371  
-1.88 -1.56 -2.64 .79 
Financial Deposit 0.0212423* 0.0440662 0.0423566*** -0.0225753  
1.86 1.39 2.82 -.40 
Insurance Premium 0.0488989** 0.0334519 0.0182875 0.0215659  
2.33 .94 1.19 .63 
Constant 0.5933507* 0.6068301** 0.2699222*** 0.3476399*  
1.94 2.20 4.01 1.87 
Number of Obs 2544 671 452 219 
Panel B: GDP per Capita Growth 
 
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.1450318 -0.3717239* 0.1363742 -0.5556563***  
-0.75 -1.92 1.23 -5.37 
GDP Growth (t-2) -0.1083693*** 0.0085858 -0.0013577 0.0711521  
-2.59 0.17 -0.03 1.26 
GDP Growth (t-3) -0.0577341 0.0101441 -0.0478679 0.0272925  
-1.18 0.27 -1.00 0.54 
Private Credit growth 0.0611857*** 0.098901*** 0.0618412* 0.0619089  
2.68 2.80 1.87 1.21 
Financial Deposit growth -0.0013343 -0.1070429** -0.0298627 -0.0535929  
-0.11 -2.02 -0.58 -1.29 
Ins. Premium growth 0.0455243* 0.1112617* 0.0272016 0.1271037  
1.92 1.72 0.81 1.54 
Constant 0.0268915*** 0.0267851*** 0.0179177*** 0.0267405***  
5.36 7.35 6.27 4.19 
Number of Obs 2411 629 427 202 
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When we do the two-step estimator with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust VCE, the results 
are shown below in Table 1.10. In Panel A, we find that GDP(t-1) is positive and significantly 
correlated to GDP per capita for all groups. The coefficient for OIC countries with Islamic finance 
(0.8380702) is greater than the other categories, indicating a stronger correlation between current 
and previous period GDP.  Insurance premium is also positively and significantly correlated to 
GDP per capita for the world, OIC countries and OIC countries with Islamic banking. We see that 
again insurance premium seems to be an indication of Islamic banking having a positive effect on 
GDP growth. In Panel B, private credit growth and insurance premium growth are both positively 
and significantly related to GDP per growth for the world and OIC countries, however not for the 
other subgroups. We cannot make any conclusion about Islamic banking from Panel B, since the 
results are insignificant.  
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Table 1.10: A two-step estimator with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust VCE 
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to a two-step estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) with 
Windmeijer bias-corrected robust VCE of each financial access or depth variable on the 
different country subgroups. Significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent 
(***) are also indicated. The variables in Panel A are normalized using logarithm. In the cross-
country regressions in the left-hand portion of the table, each dependent variable is evaluated 
over 1990-2013. 
Panel A: GDP per capita  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP (t-1) 0.7284787*** 0.6461802*** 0.8380702*** 0.5795497**  
7.01 5.07 26.1 2.44 
Private credit 0.020472 0.0357064 0.0030546 0.0529797  
0.99 1.37 0.21 0.57 
Financial deposit 0.0306508** 0.0325457 0.0201298 0.0428391  
1.9 1.49 0.80 0.54 
Insurance premium 0.0699674*** 0.0731393* 0.0619324*** 0.0306873  
3.37 1.72 3.03 0.83 
Number of Obs 2455 637 433 204 
Panel B: GDP per Capita Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP growth (t-1) 0.0438323 -0.2714901 0.2119906 -0.6303148  
0.37 -1.06 1.50 -1.13 
Private credit growth 0.0391214*** 0.0824208* 0.0518425 0.0685774  
2.95 1.67 1.46 1.05 
Financial deposit growth 0.0000566 -0.0883838 -0.0295082 -0.0295053  
0.01 -1.49 -0.71 -0.47 
Insurance premium growth 0.0462002* 0.1029017* 0.0265016 0.0795776  
1.91 1.74 0.97 1.48 
Number of Obs 2305 591 404 187 
 
In Table 1.11, we repeat the two-step estimator with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust VCE, this 
time we assume the variables are endogenous. In Panel A, GDP (t-1) again is positively and 
significantly correlated to GDP per capita across all groups. GDP (t-3) is negatively and 
significantly correlated to GDP per capita for OIC countries and OIC countries with Islamic 
banking. Financial deposits are positively and significantly correlated to GDP per capita for the 
world and OIC countries with Islamic banking. Insurance premium is also positively and 
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significantly correlated to GDP per capita for the world, OIC countries and OIC countries with 
Islamic banking. In Panel B, we find that GDP growtht-1 is positive and significantly correlated to 
OIC countries with Islamic banking but negative and significantly correlated for OIC countries 
with no Islamic countries. Private credit growth is positively and significantly correlated to GDP 
growth for all categories except OIC countries without Islamic banking.  
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Table 1.11:  Two-step estimator with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust VCE with endogenous 
variables 
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to of each financial access or depth variable on the different country 
subgroups. We assume the variables are endogenous. Significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 
percent (**), and 1 percent (***) are also indicated. The variables in Panel A are normalized 
using logarithm. In the cross-country regressions in the left-hand portion of the table, each 
dependent variable is evaluated over 1990-2013. 
Panel A: GDP per Capita  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP (t-1) 0.7424142*** 0.5929716** 1.097554*** 0.3618759**  
3.66 2.46 12.75 1.96 
GDP (t-2) 0.0406162 0.3801694 -0.1584083* 0.5532129**  
0.24 1.43 -1.69 2.27 
GDP (t-3) -0.0216312 -0.1717721** -0.0821811* -0.1282949  
-0.68 -2.18 -1.69 -1.19 
Private Credit 0.0204716 0.0137677 -0.0016698 0.034361  
1.62 1.01 -0.31 1.07 
Financial Deposit 0.0263046** 0.0132857 0.033581*** -0.0210583  
2.33 0.47 2.80 -0.33 
Insurance Premium 0.0649705*** 0.068041* 0.0438016*** 0.0736055  
2.78 1.89 3.04 1.26 
Number of Obs.  2361 618 418 200 
Panel B: GDP per Capita Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP Growth(t-1) -0.1380385 -0.3269644 0.1778858* -0.5453351***  
-0.65 -1.60 1.80 -4.65 
GDP Growth (t-2) -0.0154404 0.1535279** 0.0454022 0.1761807**  
-0.38 1.99 1.04 2.11 
GDP Growth (t-3) -0.0189271 -0.0192294 -0.0738474 0.0213701  
-0.51 -0.57 -1.34 0.31 
Private Credit growth 0.0673272*** 0.0764501*** 0.0548166** 0.0483215  
3.32 4.07 3.00 0.97 
Financial Deposit growth 0.0107387 -0.0645309** -0.0128664 -0.0494419  
0.83 -2.00 -0.40 -0.94 
Ins. Premium growth 0.0450164* 0.1001777* 0.0361923 0.1304655  
1.76 1.79 1.24 1.54 
Number of Obs. 2235 579 395 184 
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4.6 Panel VAR methodology  
While the dynamic panel estimation can present the dynamic effect of financial inclusion 
key factors for economic growth, the examination for dynamic causality, direction, and timing will 
show more sufficient information about the relationship of variables. The most well-known 
method for exploring the dynamic relationship of variables is the vector autoregressive (VAR) 
methodology, but it is only applicable for time series data, not for panel data. To use the VAR 
method for panel data, we need to use a panel data vector autoregressive methodology, which is a 
transformed VAR methodology for panel data. This approach combines the VAR approach of 
treating all variables as endogenous variables and controls heterogeneity of the panels (Love and 
Zicchino, 2006). The panel VAR model for this study is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶 +⁡∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝜂𝑖 +⁡𝑑𝑐,𝑡 +⁡𝑒𝑡
𝑚
𝑠=1 (2) 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a variable vector including all financial inclusion variables, 𝑑𝑐,𝑡 are country-
specific time dummies, and 𝑠 will be determined based on Arellano-Bond test for the serial 
correlation of GDP growth and POV for all OIC countries. It should be assumed that all panel 
individuals have the same structure if the VAR approach using panel data is applicable. For this, 
we included 𝜂𝑖 in equation (2) to consider fixed effects, due to the lagged dependence variable, 
however fixed effects will correlate with repressors and create biased estimation coefficients. To 
correct this bias, we used forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the “Helmert procedure” 
(see Arellano and Bover, 1995), which is known to be a method that preserves the orthogonality 
between transformed variables and regressors (Love and Zicchino, 2006). Therefore, this study 
estimates the dynamic VAR model with the GMM system using lagged regressors. 
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To estimate the impulse-response functions (IRFs), we can calculate confidence intervals 
using the matrix of IRFs from the coefficients of the panel VAR. For this, we will calculate the 
standard error of IRFs and create confidence intervals using Monte Carlo simulations approach. 
On the other hand, forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) are a method that can 
show the percentage of variation in one variable that is affected by the shock of another variable 
over time. That is, since FEVD can show the response of one variable over time to a single 
innovation in itself or another variable, FEVDs can represent the strength of the whole effect. 
Therefore, we can report FEVDs over two, five, and ten years to examine the cumulative total 
effects over time. 
We first conduct a unit root test for our four variables, GDP growth, private credit, financial 
deposit and insurance. We reject the null hypothesis of unit root test for our four variables. We 
look for cointegration between the variables and we find that we reject H0 for all variables except 
GDP growth and private credit. Which implies that all the other variables are cointegrated of order 
(1, 1). However, Phillip-Perron rejects all the variables. However it shows that GDP growth is not 
cointegrated with the other variables. Economically these variables should be cointegrated 
therefore we are assuming that they are and moving on to estimating Panel VAR and Granger 
causality.  
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Table 1.12: Panel VAR 
This table shows the estimated coefficient, z-statistic (in parentheses), and number of 
observations corresponding to a panel VAR regression of each financial access or depth variable 
on the different country subgroups. Significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 
percent (***) are also indicated. The variables in Panel A are normalized using logarithm. In the 
cross-country regressions in the left-hand portion of the table, each dependent variable is 
evaluated over 1990-2013. 
Panel A: GDP Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP Growth(t-1) 0.3208333*** 0.2831538*** 0.4031887*** 0.1399427  
7.43 2.76 3.17 0.81 
GDP Growth(t-2) 0.0717159* 0.2155516** 0.093669 0.3045929*  
1.83 2.41 1.49 1.65 
Private Credit growth(t-1) -0.0010166 -0.0004113 -0.0070202 0.0084326  
-0.1 -0.02 -0.27 0.17 
Private Credit growth(t-2) -0.0054866 -0.0145711 -0.0057198 -0.041223  
-0.5 -1.06 -0.43 -1.01 
Financial Deposit growth(t-1) 0.0543897*** 0.0638664** 0.0603798* 0.106369  
4.16 2.30 1.84 1.62 
Financial Deposit growth(t-2) -0.0245731 -0.0760608 -0.0110612 -0.1849432  
-0.87 -0.96 -0.39 -0.94 
Insurance premium growth(t-1) -0.0006252 0.0020391 -0.0186759 0.0054959  
-0.11 0.12 -1.03 0.23 
Insurance premium growth(t-2) -0.00000773 -0.0256678 0.0260844 -0.0624258*  
0 -1.11 1.37 -1.82 
Panel B: Private Credit Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP Growth(t-1) 0.9027304*** 0.8607781*** 0.9289518*** 0.7829477***  
9.63 4.32 3.54 2.75 
GDP Growth(t-2) 0.055749 0.0104022 0.1272772 -0.2341829  
0.65 0.06 0.63 -0.91 
Private Credit growth(t-1) 0.6213705*** 0.6126877*** 0.5825644*** 0.6551784***  
14.03 6.28 4.24 4.94 
Private Credit growth(t-2) -0.1252048*** -0.0894335 -0.0250844 -0.2805829**  
-3.12 -1.18 -0.36 -2.36 
Financial Deposit growth(t-1) -0.1328897*** -0.200418* -0.1940266 -0.1903437  
-2.62 -1.69 -1.36 -0.95 
Financial Deposit growth(t-2) 0.0310482 -0.0587696 -0.0776796 0.0656653  
0.75 -0.58 -0.85 0.35 
Insurance premium growth(t-1) -0.0970508*** -0.0793074 -0.1418272** -0.0298357  
-4.44 -1.64 -2.49 -0.44 
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Insurance premium growth(t-2) -0.0343707 0.0234696 0.0152154 0.015574  
-1.19 0.51 0.29 0.22 
Panel C: Financial Deposit Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP Growth(t-1) 0.5737774*** 0.4684178*** 0.4067512** 0.6200728**  
5.41 3.19 2.28 2.51 
GDP Growth(t-2) 0.1186029 0.2461392* 0.2876968** 0.1775296  
1.30 1.91 2.03 0.72 
Private Credit growth(t-1) -0.2214927 -0.0605166 -0.052211 -0.0469387  
-1.58 -0.91 -0.66 -0.42 
Private Credit growth(t-2) 0.1682343** 0.0740805 0.0968169** 0.002459  
2.07 1.56 2.21 0.02 
Financial Deposit growth(t-1) 0.7699885*** 0.3834329*** 0.3830782*** 0.3876418**  
2.65 4.43 3.93 2.42 
Financial Deposit growth(t-2) -0.281466 -0.209389*** -0.2155383*** -0.1625487  
-2.04** -2.87 -2.74 -1.08 
Insurance premium growth(t-1) -0.1089369*** -0.0913037** -0.1586385*** -0.0351291  
-3.18 -2.14 -2.88 -0.65 
Insurance premium growth(t-2) 0.0199515 0.0364254 0.0375319 0.0243204  
0.82 0.95 0.74 0.47 
Panel D: Insurance Premium Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB 
GDP Growth(t-1) 0.4629607*** 0.2940479 0.2834881 0.355314  
3.53 1.11 0.95 0.81 
GDP Growth(t-2) 0.1294539 -0.0282616 0.093018 -0.319607  
0.96 -0.12 0.32 -0.98 
Private Credit growth(t-1) 0.0897362 0.0602435 0.0821924 -0.0038391  
1.61 0.50 0.83 -0.02 
Private Credit growth(t-2) -0.0610528 -0.0888598 -0.1124901* -0.0751436  
-1.44 -1.3 -1.74 -0.39 
Financial Deposit growth(t-1) 0.0641689 0.1702459 0.1165349 0.3795216*  
1.23 1.54 1.03 1.73 
Financial Deposit growth(t-2) 0.0032914 -0.0244879 -0.0545491 0.0004079  
0.07 -0.22 -0.53 0.00 
Insurance premium growth(t-1) 0.0163518 -0.0050237 -0.073545 0.0448622  
0.37 -0.05 -1.04 0.24 
Insurance premium growth(t-2) 0.056554 -0.0666765 0.0515245 -0.1742345*  
1.38 -0.99 0.74 -1.81 
 
38 
 
For our panel VAR regression, each variable is regressed on 2 lags of each of the variables 
including itself. And the same regression is done for each of the other variables. The results are 
presented in Table 1.12 above. Panel A looks at the GDP growth, we see that GDP Growth(t-1) it 
is positively and significantly correlated to GDP growth for  all groups except OIC with no Islamic 
banking, for which the results are insignificant. Looking at the coeffecients we find that OIC 
countries with Islamic banking has the highest coefficient with 0.4031887 with a 1 percent 
significance, the coefficients for the other categories are lower, indicating that countries with 
Islamic banking is doing better on average. Financial Deposit growth(t-1) is positive and 
significantly correlated to GDP and OIC countries with Islamic banking are higher than the 
coefficient for the world, indicating that Islamic banking may be beneficial in this region.  
Insurance premium growth(t-2) is negative and significant for OIC countries with not Islamic 
banking.  
Panel B looks at Private credit growth, we see that the results show that the first and third 
lags of GDP growth positively affects the current GDP, GDP Growth(t-1)  is positively and 
significantly correlated to private credit growth. Again the coefficient for OIC countries with 
Islamic banking (.9289518) is higher than the other coefficients, indicating that it has a stronger 
correlation with private credit growth. The one period lag of private credit is positively and 
significantly correlated to current period private credit growth for all groups. The two period lag 
of private credit is negatively and significantly correlated to the current period private credit 
growth for the world and for OIC countries with no Islamic banking.  Financial Deposit growth(t-
1) is negatively and significantly correlated to private credit growth for the world and OIC 
countries. Insurance premium growth(t-1) is negatively and Insurance premium growth(t-1) 
correlated to private credit growth for the world and OIC countries with Islamic banking.  
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Panel C looks at financial deposit growth, we find that it is positively and significantly 
correlated to GDP Growth(t-1) across all groups, the coefficient for OIC countries without Islamic 
banking (.6200728) is the highest, therefore we cannot draw any conclusions about Islamic finance 
being beneficial. The two period lag of GDP is also positively and significantly correlated for OIC 
countries and OIC countries with Islamic banking. The one period lag of private credit growth 
does not produce significant results but the Private Credit growth(t-2)  positively and significantly 
correlated to financial deposit growth for the world and OIC countries with Islamic banking. The 
one period lag of financial deposit growth is positively and significantly correlated to the current 
period for all groups and the two period lag is negatively and significantly correlated for OIC 
countries and OIC countries with Islamic banking. Insurance premium growth(t-1) is negatively and 
significantly correlated to financial deposit growth across all groups. All the coefficients for OIC 
countries with Islamic banking are lower than the other categories in this Panel and therefore we 
cannot arrive at any conclusions about Islamic banking for this panel.  
Panel D looks at insurance premium growth. The results for this part of the table are mostly 
insignificant.  
4.7 Panel Granger causality test 
In order to examine the directions of causality between variables, we estimate the panel 
Granger causality test. A Granger causality test that uses panel data can be separated in two ways. 
The first method is to treat the panel as one large stacked set of data, in which all coefficients are 
assumed to be common over whole cross-sections. The Granger causality test (Granger, 1969) is 
then estimated in a standard method in which all coefficients are assumed to be the same across 
the panels without concerning cross-sectional differences and the panel data is treated the same as 
ordinary time series data.  
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The second method is to examine the Granger causality test with the assumption that all 
the coefficients are different across all cross-sections, which is adopted by Dumitrescu-Hurlin 
(2012). This method calculates the standard Granger causality tests for each panel and calculates 
a Zbar statistic from the average of the test statistics. 
We need to examine the Granger causality test with the first method, because although our 
panel data has cross-sectional differences between countries, there are a lot of missing data in the 
GFDD for the OIC countries to calculate appropriate Granger causality statistics. Accordingly, we 
use the Granger causality test approach that assumes all cross-sections have the same coefficients 
and treats the panel as one large stacked set of data. It is expected that the Granger causality test 
can show the overall direction of causality for all variables. 
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Table 1.13: Panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test  
This table shows the estimated χ2 corresponding to a Panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test 
of each financial access or depth variable on the different country subgroups. The variables in 
Panel A are normalized using logarithm. In the cross-country regressions in the left-hand 
portion of the table, each dependent variable is evaluated over 1990-2013. The hypothesis is 
that excluded variable does not Granger-cause Equation variable and the alternative hypothesis 
is that the excluded variable Granger-causes the equation variable 
Panel A: GDP Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB  
χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 
Private credit growth 0.399 1.446 0.345 1.238  
0.819 0.485 0.841 0.538 
Financial Deposit Growth 17.621 6.836 3.458 3.143  
0 0.033 0.177 0.208 
Ins. Premium Growth 0.012 1.47 3.661 3.312  
0.994 0.479 0.16 0.191 
ALL 23.679 10.887 6.313 6.546  
0.001 0.092 0.389 0.365 
Panel B: Private Credit Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB  
χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 
GDP Growth 92.787 19.107 15.455 9.332  
0 0 0 0.009 
Financial Deposit Growth 6.881 3.44 2.798 0.95  
0.032 0.179 0.247 0.622 
Ins. Premium Growth 21.741 2.717 6.236 0.198  
0 0.257 0.044 0.906 
ALL 114.586 31.278 32.169 11.411  
0 0 0 0.076 
Panel C: Financial Deposits Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB  
χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 
GDP Growth 31.115 13.503 9.868 6.305  
0 0.001 0.007 0.043 
Private credit growth 4.954 2.492 4.957 0.216  
0.084 0.288 0.084 0.898 
Ins. Premium Growth 10.336 4.91 9.065 0.472  
0.006 0.086 0.011 0.79 
ALL 77.963 23.67 28.926 6.724  
0 0.001 0 0.347 
Panel D: Insurance Premium Growth  
World OIC OIC with ISB OIC no ISB  
χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 
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GDP Growth 13.141 1.241 1.19 1.674  
0.001 0.538 0.552 0.433 
Private credit growth 3.224 1.692 3.053 0.188  
0.199 0.429 0.217 0.91 
Financial Deposit Growth 1.656 2.411 1.365 3.18  
0.437 0.3 0.505 0.204 
ALL 29.014 9.298 11.577 8.621  
0 0.158 0.072 0.196 
 
Table 1.13 shows our results for the Granger Causality test. We set our null hypothesis, H0, 
as excluded variable does not Granger-cause Equation variable and the alternative hypothesis, Ha, 
as excluded variable Granger-causes Equation variable. Here, we find that financial deposit is 
granger causing GDP growth. However, the relationship is not one way. GDP growth in turn 
granger causes growth in financial deposit. Each of the variables has significant causation effect 
on financial deposit and private credit. Insurance premium seems to be affected by only GDP 
growth. These results along with panel VAR indicate that improvement in financial deposits has 
had a positive impact on growth. The effects are stronger for OIC countries. 
5. Methodology and Empirical Findings for Poverty Analysis 
5.1 Proxy measures for financial inclusion and poverty 
Another aspect of this study is looking at poverty alleviation. Can increased Islamic 
banking help with poverty alleviation? To answer this question we have to use proxies for financial 
inclusion. Beck, Demurgic-Kunt and Levine (2004) study whether financial development 
disproportionately raises the incomes of the poor and alleviates poverty.  They find that financial 
development reduces income inequality by disproportionately boosting the incomes of the poor. 
They use proxy measures for poverty alleviation which we will also be looking at. The variables 
are described in the Table B below. 
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Table B 
Poverty Variables That affect Financial 
Inclusion 
Definition 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in constant 1995 US$ 
Income share held by lowest 20% 
 
Percentage share of income or consumption held by 
the poorest 20% of the population 
Growth of GINI The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between 
the Lorenz Curve, which plots share of population 
against income share received, to the area below the 
diagonal. It lies between 0 and 1, where 0 is perfect 
equality and 1 is perfect inequality. The growth rate 
is calculated as the log difference between the last 
and the first available observations, divided by the 
number of years. 
Growth of Headcount Headcount is the percentage of the population living 
below the national poverty line, as defined as living 
on $1 a day. The growth rate is calculated as the log 
difference between the last and the first available 
observations, divided by the number of years. 
Growth of poverty gap The poverty gap is defined as the mean shortfall from 
the poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the 
poverty line. The growth rate is calculated as the log 
difference between the last and the first available 
observations, divided by the number of years. 
 
In this part of our study we are trying to evaluate the impact of financial intermediaries 
(inclusion) on poverty and poverty alleviation. As we do not have a direct measure of financial 
inclusion, we must use proxies for financial inclusion. Following Beck et al (2004) to study the 
impact of financial development on the poor, we use the proxy variables listed in Table B. These 
variables include, the growth of the income of the poorest 20 percent in each subcategory, using 
this variable we should be able to see how financial development will affect the poorest portion of 
the economy. Next we use the growth of the Gini coefficient, this variable measure income 
inequality in each country, the Gini coefficient ranges between zero – perfect equality -and one, 
where larger values imply greater income inequality. We look at the growth rate of the Gini 
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coefficient to see whether income inequality is growing or shrinking in the economy. Our third 
variable is the growth of headcount, equals the growth rate in the percentage of the population 
living below $1 dollar per day. And our last proxy for poverty is the growth rate of the Poverty 
Gap, the mean shortfall from the poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. 
5.2 Methodology for Poverty Alleviation  
To study the relationship between financial inclusion growth and poverty alleviation we 
use a basic ordinary lease squares equation (OLS). We follow methodology similar to Beck et al 
(2004) and use cross-country regressions, calculating growth rates of income, inequality and 
poverty over two different periods, one with data starting in 1990 and the other with the longest 
available time period and averaging financial inclusion development and other explanatory 
variables over the corresponding time period. The reason for using cross-country regressions is the 
lack of poverty data, this data is only available for a few years in a very unbalanced time series 
form.  
First we calculate the income growth of the poor. To do so we use data over the period 
1990-2015 and use the following equation:  
(yi,p,t − yi,p,t-n )/n= αFDi +βXi +εi (7) 
In this regression, yi,p,t represents the logarithm of average per capita income of the poorest 
income quintile, GINI index, poverty gap, and poverty headcount ratio in country i in year t, FDi 
is the matrix of average growth in  measures of financial inclusion in country i, and Xi is a dummy 
for countries with Islamic finance. 
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Table 1.14: Cross-sectional Poverty Alleviation  
The coefficients in this table are the results of simple OLS regressions. All the variables reflect 
average growth (per year) over the whole available sample period. Significance levels of 10 
percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***) are also indicated. 
 GINI Index Income share 
by lowest 20% 
Poverty Gap  Poverty 
Headcount Ratio 
Panel A: Data starting 1990 
Private Credit -0.03609 0.078673 0.253217 -0.10169  
(0.127) (0.129) (0.103) (0.365) 
Private Deposit -0.01018 0.121741** -0.79264*** -0.22729  
(0.692) (0.021) (0) (0.125) 
Insurance Premium 0.028258* 0.024842 -0.2373*** -0.17402***  
(0.085) (0.517) (0) (0.002) 
Islamic Finance Dummy -0.00398 0.010769* 0.012024 -0.01838*  
(0.146) (0.063) (0.324) (0.086) 
Constant 0.000157 0.008278** -0.00132 0.002792  
(0.925) (0.022) (0.891) (0.727) 
Number of Obs 135 121 75 102 
Panel B: For all the available years 
   
Private Credit -0.01895 0.073018 0.293591* -0.07256  
(0.512) (0.242) (0.09) (0.538) 
Private Deposit 0.026543 0.138782* -0.85546*** -0.21201  
(0.476) (0.066) (0) (0.194) 
Insurance Premium 0.008388 0.019984 -0.22627*** -0.17177***  
(0.617) (0.607) (0) (0.002) 
Islamic Finance Dummy -0.00511** 0.009699* 0.013051 -0.01597  
(0.069) (0.098) (0.295) (0.142) 
Constant -0.00014 0.006644* 5.37E-05 -0.00122  
(0.94) (0.092) (0.996) (0.883) 
Number of Obs 135 121 75 102 
 
The results in Table 1.14, are rather interesting. Looking at the Islamic finance dummy, we 
see that there is a positive and significant relationship with the income share held by the lowest 20 
percent, this implies that Islamic finance has a positive impact on the income of the poorest 
individuals in the OIC countries. We also see that Islamic finance has a negative and significant 
correlation with poverty, this implies that the poverty rate is decreasing with Islamic finance. These 
results are very motivating, they show that Islamic finance is beneficial to this region. We also see 
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in Panel B of Table 1.14 that Islamic finance also has a negative and significant relationship with 
the Gini index, this shows that the growth the Gini coefficient is negative, which implies that the 
income inequality between the rich and the poor is decreasing, which is also an indication of 
poverty reduction. Looking at the other variables we see that private deposit growth has a positive 
and significant correlation with income share of the lowest 20 percent of the population and also 
a negative and significant correlation with poverty gap. These results imply that private deposit 
had a significant influence in increasing the income of the poor as well as decreasing the poverty 
gap. Insurance premium growth has a negative and significant correlation with poverty gap as well 
as poverty headcount ratio, implying that insurance premium can help reduce both of these 
variables.  We cannot draw any useful conclusions from the private credit growth variable. The 
growth in financial intermediaries, especially Islamic banking, seems to have a positive effect on 
poverty alleviation. Therefore, it is worthwhile to increase Islamic banking in this region.  
6. Conclusion  
In this paper we aim to find the connection between financial inclusion variables and its 
effect on the poverty levels in OIC countries. Having access to financial services is important. It 
offers savings, credit, and risk management to individuals who have accounts. Inclusive financial 
services is beneficial for all individuals. It helps increase their ability to borrow and save money 
for large or emergency situations. Involuntary financial exclusion can be problematic and needs 
policy action to remedy this issue. Studies have found that there is a relationship between levels 
of financial exclusion and economic growth or poverty.  Researchers and policymakers use 
financial inclusion policies to increase the number of individuals, households and small and 
medium size enterprises that are now either fully or partially excluded from financial industry. As 
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people become more financially included, they gain power to use financial services to improve 
their life and that of their families.  
About a quarter of the world’s population is Muslim and a significant proportion of these 
individuals voluntarily exclude themselves from the financial system, since commercial financial 
services go against Shari’a law. There has been an increase in Shari’a compliant financial products 
and insurances, which plays a significant role in increasing the level of financial inclusion of 
Islamic countries. Increasing access to formal financial services in these countries will give the 
adults more ways to save and invest, which may help with economic growth in that country.  
There are many different reasons that studying financial inclusion and economic growth in 
OIC countries is important. Researching Islamic countries will provide useful information about 
the relationship between financial inclusion and economic growth. The demand for Shari’a 
compliant financial services is expected to increase and this information will be useful to provide 
desired financial products. Shari’a compliant financial products have relatively low speculative 
characteristics compared to western financial services, and therefore has attracted a lot of attention 
in recent years, and these products have sufficient development potential.  Poverty is an ongoing 
problem across many countries that are members of the OIC and studying variables that affect 
financial inclusion may help policymakers include more people in the financial system that are 
being excluded which may help reduce poverty.  
Our results for the effect of financial inclusion on GDP growth, has some positive and 
significant results in regards to private credit growth. These two variables are positively and 
significantly correlated for most of the tests we conducted. Therefore we can say that Islamic 
finance is a positive initiative in OIC countries. However financial deposits do not have significant 
results for most of the tests we conducted and therefore we cannot draw any conclusions for that 
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variable. We were unable to divide our sample, due to lack of data, into Islamic banks and 
commercial banks and therefore, even though we attribute the economic growth to Islamic finance 
it may also be due to an increase in commercial banking.  Our answer to the first part of our 
question, does financial inclusion have an impact on economic growth, is answered by  our results, 
yes it does but not as much as we had hoped for. Increasing Islamic finance and commercial 
banking will be beneficial in these areas, giving businesses and individuals more access to funds 
to increase their investment and savings opportunities.  
The results for the effect of financial inclusion on poverty alleviation has even more 
noteworthy implications. Since we were able to include a dummy variable for Islamic banking we 
can see the affects that variable has on our poverty proxy variables. We see that Islamic finance 
has a positive and significant impact on income share of held by the lowest 20 percent of the 
population implying that Islamic finance has a positive impact on the income of poor people in 
OIC member countries. We also see that Islamic finance has negative and significant correlation 
with poverty headcount ratio, implying that it helps alleviate the percentage of individuals living 
below $1 per day. Islamic finance also has a negative and significant correlation with the growth 
of Gini coefficient, implying that there is less variation in the income of the rich and the poor 
which indicates that individuals are increasing their income.  
We conclude by saying that Islamic finance can help increase economic growth and 
decrease poverty. However, the countries covered in this study are mostly developing nations who 
may be experiencing large amount of growth, and the data was hard to come by since developing 
countries lack data. There is no Islamic financial development index, which would have been 
useful to truly study the effects of Islamic finance in this region, and may be an idea for future 
research.  
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Chapter 2: Asymmetric Market Reactions to the 2007-08 Financial Crisis: From Wall Street 
to Main Street 
1. Introduction 
The 2007 – 2008 U.S. economic recession was one of the worst in recent history, second 
only to the Great Depression. The financial crisis that caused the recession resulted in the failure 
of many financial institutions and had important real sector implications, including the near-
collapse of the U.S. auto industry. As a consequence, government agencies and policymakers 
strived to enact policies and design programs in order to help curtail the financial crisis and 
restore faith in the financial system.   
The financial crisis unfolded over a period of roughly two years in 2007 and 2008, 
whereby information regarding the scope and severity of the crisis were made known to the 
financial markets and regulators and policymakers began to respond to the crisis. The 2013 USA 
Today article “A Repeat of 2008? Not Impossible” outlines many of the events that were 
significant in the evolution of the financial crisis and provides a timeline of the major events 
associated with the financial crisis and the dates on which those events where announced to the 
public and financial markets. The financial crisis began with an increase in defaults in subprime 
mortgages in February 2007. Banks and hedge funds were left with assets that were of 
questionable value and, thus, were highly illiquid. There were several events that took place 
shortly, thereafter. Such as, Freddie Mac announced that it would no longer buy risky subprime 
loans and New Century Financial filed for bankruptcy protection. A few months later Bear 
Stearns liquidated two hedge funds that invested in risky subprime mortgage-backed securities, 
among other events.  As the crisis got worse, the Federal Reserve (Fed) realized that normal 
monetary policy changes were not enough to address the situation, and policymakers began a 
series of unconventional policies in an attempt to control the spread of the crisis.   
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By 2008, as a result of the financial crisis, the U.S. economy was in recession. The crisis 
in subprime mortgages had infected the credit markets, so the Federal Reserve began to create 
new facilities, changed its lending rules, and even injected large amounts of capital into financial 
institutions.  On January 11, 2008, Bank of America agreed to purchase the failing Countrywide 
Financial. Then Fed stepped in and guaranteed $30 billion of the troubled financial institution 
Bear Stearns’ assets in order to facilitate its purchase by J.P. Morgan Chase. In July, the Fed 
seized IndyMac Federal Bank, as it was about to fail. In September, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were taken over by the government, Bank of America agreed to purchase Merrill Lynch, 
and Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy court protection as well as, American International 
Group (AIG) accepted an $85 billion federal bailout, giving the government almost an 80% stake 
in the company. The government gained control of other investment banks and incited more 
buyouts of smaller banks.  
As a further response to the continuing financial crisis, Congress proposed a $700 billion 
relief package known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on September 29, but it was 
initially rejected. This sent the Down Jones industrial average down 778 points, the single worst 
point drop in history. Less than a week later, on October 3, 2008, Congress passed a version of 
TARP and President Bush signed it.  
There are several important events during the U.S. financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 that 
made the entire financial system vulnerable. The series of failures or near failures of so many 
financial institutions during the crisis motivates our analysis of how the financial markets react to 
these types of financial crisis events. Financial markets can be volatile and react to events in the 
economy when information becomes available. In perfectly efficient markets, this information 
can be incorporated into asset prices instantaneously, risk can be priced efficiently, and we 
53 
 
should observe no unexpected returns in the market, as defined in the context of an asset pricing 
model. However, when markets are less efficient at producing information, perhaps during a time 
of great uncertainty like a financial crisis, events may be unanticipated, and stock prices may 
move suddenly in unpredictable ways. Therefore, studying the abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of crisis events can help investors, regulators, and policymakers understand how 
markets react to financial sector news and lead to a better understanding of the function and 
efficiency of the financial markets. There is some existing literature pertaining to the impact of 
specific events in the financial crisis, but there are currently no studies that look at the 
cumulative and individual effects of crisis announcements on stockholder wealth. Additionally, 
there is limited research on the degree to which crisis events impact other financial firms, as well 
as the degree to which financial market event announcements spillover to the stock returns of 
real sector firm. Therefore, we conduct empirical analyses that increases the understanding of the 
how financial crisis information is incorporated into asset prices. 
For our empirical analysis, we create portfolios of financial, real sector, and event firms 
and test for the existence of abnormal stock returns surrounding event days when significant 
financial crisis news was released to the financial markets. We use daily stock return data from 
the CRSP database from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2009 and use event day and interval 
dummy variables to estimate financial crisis event-related abnormal returns in the context of an 
asset pricing model robust to the factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). We 
examine estimated crisis event abnormal returns for portfolios of different size financial, real 
sector, and event firms, formed using industry SIC Codes and stock ticker symbols. Our results 
show that portfolio abnormal returns for non-financial, financial, and event-related firms are 
significant for daily intervals surrounding the announcement of financial crisis news. In 
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particular, we find that estimated abnormal returns are negative for non-financial firms of all 
sizes, as well as small and mid-sized financial firms; however, the abnormal returns are positive 
for larger financial institutions.  
In an extension of our results, we further examine the financial services industry by 
forming portfolios of two-digit SIC industry financial firms. The results show that the negative 
abnormal returns in response to financial crisis events seen by smaller financial firms are mainly 
driven by the negative and significant abnormal returns for portfolios of broker-dealer, 
depository, holding-investment, and real estate firms. In addition, the positive abnormal returns 
experienced by larger financial firms are mainly driven by positive and significant abnormal 
returns for the portfolio of large depository institutions. Finally, we analyze the impact of 
individual financial crisis event announcements on stock market abnormal returns. The results 
show that, while not all events are associated with abnormal returns, there are several events 
during the recent financial crisis that consistently correspond to abnormal returns for portfolios 
having different characteristics. For example, the credit rating downgrade of Countrywide 
financial, the government backing of Bear Sterns’ assets, the collapse of mortgage companies 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the government rescue of AIG, and U.S. automakers’ requesting 
access to TARP funds are all associated with consistent negative abnormal announcement returns 
for small and mid-sized portfolios of both financial and real sector firms. On the other hand, the 
conversion of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs into holding companies, the government 
rescue of Citigroup, and the extension of TARP funds to major U.S. automakers are associated 
with positive abnormal event day returns, particularly for real sector and larger financial firms.   
The results provided in this study present new empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
financial crises on both financial sector and real firms and sheds light on how financial crisis risk 
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is priced in the financial markets. For example, the estimation of negative abnormal returns for 
non-financial portfolios of all sizes illustrates that there is significant spillover of the impact of 
financial crisis events to the abnormal stock returns of non-financial firms. In fact, the estimated 
negative abnormal returns for smaller real sector firms are larger than those estimated for small 
financial firms. In addition, we can interpret positive and significant abnormal returns for large 
depository institutions in response to financial crisis news as a perception of depository 
institutions having relatively lower risk, potentially due to possible Federal government 
intervention. Finally, despite mixed results in the direction and magnitude of abnormal returns in 
response to individual crisis events, some events, such as the conversion of Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs into holding companies and the government bailout of Citigroup are met with 
positive abnormal returns, as large financial firms and policymakers attempted to dampen the 
crisis.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes previous literature on the subject. 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology used in the empirical analyses. Section 4 presents 
the specific financial crisis events and reports event interval summary statistics. Section 5 
estimates event interval abnormal returns for portfolios of financial, real sector, and financial 
sub-industry firms. In section 6, we analyze the event interval abnormal returns for portfolios of 
firms directly impacted by the crisis events. Our results are extended in Section 7 with an 
analysis of the specific impact of each crisis event on the estimated abnormal returns of 
portfolios of financial, real sector, and event firms. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Previous Literature 
Study Sample Major Objectives Findings 
Kabir and 
Hassan (2005) 
Their sample consists of 
commercial banks, S&L 
Institutions, investment banks and 
insurance companies and their 
sample period is June 6, 1996 to 
October 14, 1998.   
 
Analyze the announcements 
pertaining to the Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) 
hedge fund in 1998. 
The day following LTCM publically 
announced its losses the returns of all 
portfolios reacted adversely. The 
involvement of the Fed with LTCM resulted 
in a positive impact on the industry and the 
day on which the market came to know about 
the bailout, the returns of all portfolios 
declined.  However, once the bailout was 
announced by the media the following day, 
the market reacted favorably. 
Safa, Hasan & 
Maroney 
(2012) 
They look at the returns of firms 
from four financial industries - 
banking, insurance, brokerage 
firms, and S&Ls for the period 
September 5, 
2007 to December 31, 2008 
Study AIG announcements in 
2007 and 2008  
They find that the dates pertaining to AIG’s 
announcements of heavy losses result in no 
significant impact on the market. They find 
no significant evidence that supports the 
Federal Reserve’s perception of AIG as too-
big-to-fail, but the near failure of AIG spread 
a serious contagion effect and caused an 
increased systemic risk in the financial 
industry. 
Mamun, 
Hassan & 
Johnson (2010) 
Their sample consists of banks, 
brokerage firms, insurance 
companies and S&Ls for the period 
January 2006 to December 2008. 
Investigate whether the market 
responds to government 
intervention. 
They find that adjustments to the TAF had 
negative effects on the market, whereas the 
creation of and announcements related to 
TSLF and PDCF had positive wealth effects 
for bank portfolios, savings and loans 
portfolios, and primary dealer portfolios 
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Li, Madura & 
Richie (2013) 
Their sample consists of new bonds 
issues, they screen the newly issued 
bonds to eliminate all preferred 
securities, but retain equity-linked 
and pay-in-kind (PIK) bonds. Their 
sample period is from September 
15, 2007 through March 15, 2009.  
Examine the reaction of the 
bond market after the collapse 
of prominent investment banks. 
After the Fed’s first bailout of Bear Stearns, 
bonds recovered with a positive abnormal 
return. Once Lehman Brothers Merrill Lynch 
and AIG filed for bankruptcy, there was a 
negative and significant corporate bond 
market response, which was more 
pronounced for financial firms, larger firms, 
and firms that had higher financial leverage.  
Ivashina and 
Scharfstein 
(2010) 
Their sample consists of syndicated 
loans issued between 2000 and 
2008.  
They examine the period after 
the failure of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008, when there 
was a run by short-term bank 
creditors, making it hard for 
banks to roll over their short 
term debt. 
Their results show that banks were less likely 
to cut their lending if they had better access 
to deposit financing, thereby making them 
less dependent on short-term debt. Banks that 
co-syndicated more of their credit lines with 
Lehman Brothers were more vulnerable and 
reduced their lending to a greater extent. 
Sorokina and 
Thornton 
(2013) 
 Conduct an event study on the 
equity market reaction to the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Act. 
Dodd-Frank may have lowered the risk for 
financial firms, but it may have increased the 
risk for the overall economy.   
Berger, Black, 
Bouwman & 
Dlugosz (2014) 
They used data on discount 
window and TAF usage during the 
crisis over the period of August 20, 
2007 to December 31, 2009. 
Examine the impact of the 
discount window and Term 
Auction Facility, which banks 
used these facilities and 
whether they affected bank 
lending. 
They find that small banks that borrowed 
funds had less capital and higher portfolio 
risk, consistent with a greater need for the 
funds. Large banks receiving funds were 
generally healthier. They do not find any 
evidence that small and large banks that 
utilized the programs increased their lending, 
relative to banks that did not.  
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Berger and 
Roman (2013) 
Their sample consists of 572 
BHCs, 87 commercial banks, 48 
thrifts and 2 S&L, and their sample 
period is 2006:Q1 to 2010:Q4. 
Look at a program enacted by 
the government by examining 
the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP) and whether 
or not it gave banks that 
participated a competitive 
advantage. 
They find that TARP recipients did have a 
competitive advantage, as it increased their 
market shares and market power.  
Hoffman 
(2012) 
Uses two survey datasets from the 
Pew Research Center. 
 
Examine public opinion 
surrounding the TARP program 
They found that it was “one of the most 
hated, misunderstood, and effective policies 
in modern economic history”.  
Cornett, Li & 
Tehranian 
(2013) 
This study examines quarterly 
operating performance of TARP 
Capital Purchase Program recipient 
banks and TARP non-recipient 
banks from the first quarter of 2007 
through the first quarter of 2011. 
Examine how the pre-crisis 
health of banks is related to the 
probability of receiving and 
repaying TARP funds.  
They examine the healthiest (over-achiever) 
versus the least healthy (under-achiever) 
banks and Find that TARP under-achievers 
have weaker income production, and they 
also have liquidity issues. TARP over-
achievers, on the other hand, perform well, 
but still have some liquidity issues that hurt 
their lending. 
Hipper and 
Hassan (2015) 
 Analyzes the impact of 
macroeconomic and financial 
stress on the profitability of 
financial firms by utilizing data 
from 1980 to 2010 and 
modelling firm profitability and 
stock returns using a panel 
regression, fixed-effect 
methodology. 
They show that that the profitability of all 
firms is negatively affected by increases in 
macroeconomic and financial stress. Their 
results coincide with the risks associated with 
recent trends in the financial services 
industry, such as deregulation, global market 
integration, financial product innovation, and 
the increasing predominance of non-
depository intermediation. 
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We extend previous studies in this area by testing for abnormal returns surrounding 
significant event announcements during the recent financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 in order to 
examine their impact on the equity markets. We include crisis events that contain relevant 
information regarding the severity of the crisis, including credit downgrades and financial firm 
failures, as well as policy response news, such as the creation of government-sponsored 
assistance programs. We extend the literature in this area by providing empirical results 
regarding the impact of these events on the financial markets and portfolios of stocks from 
different industries and of different sizes.  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 The Data 
In this study, we generate equity portfolios having different characteristics and calculate 
abnormal returns for the designated event intervals surrounding financial crisis news 
announcements. Specially, we analyze estimated abnormal portfolio returns achieved over four 
intervals surrounding the event announcements: a.) the event announcement day (t=0); b.) the 
interval including the day prior to the announcement through the announcement day (t=–1, 0); c.) 
the interval from the day prior to the announcement through the day following the event 
announcement (t=–1, +1); and d.) the interval from two days prior to the announcement through 
the day following the event announcement (t=–2, +1).   We assume that announcement 
information is incorporated into prices efficiently; however, including intervals surrounding the 
event days adds robustness to the analysis by allowing for the anticipation of announcements as 
well as short delays in announcement reactions due to the timing of the announcements and other 
factors. 
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In order to achieve a representative sample of returns adequate to apply an asset pricing 
model, we sample daily stock return data from the CRSP database from January 1, 2006 to 
December 31, 2009, which spans the time frame of the identified financial crisis events. For the 
purpose of estimating abnormal event returns, we gather equity portfolio risk factors, including 
the risk-free rate and the risk factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) from the 
website of Kenneth French in order to apply an asset pricing model and calculate event-day 
abnormal returns. We test for the presence of event announcement abnormal returns for 
portfolios of firms in different industries and sub-industries using SIC codes reported by CRSP, 
and we examine the event announcement abnormal returns of portfolios composed of firms of 
different sizes by sorting firms based on market capitalization. In section 5, we analyze the 
portfolio of financial firms defined by firms with reported SIC codes between 6000 and 6999. 
Later in section 5, we further analyze the event abnormal returns of seven financial firm 
subsector portfolios, defined by reported two-digit SIC codes. We also examine the abnormal 
event announcement returns of portfolios of different sizes by sorting firms into market 
capitalization terciles. For each day t, we define the market capitalization as the opening price of 
the stock on day t (or closing price of day t-1) multiplied by the number of shares outstanding for 
day t-1. We then form small, mid, and large capitalization portfolios by sorting firms into terciles 
by market capitalization for each day. In addition, we also utilize the calculated market 
capitalizations to weight the portfolios when constructing value-weighted portfolios. 
3.2 Event abnormal return estimation methodology 
In testing for abnormal returns, an event study methodology is often employed, whereby 
normal returns are estimated over an interval leading up to the event, and abnormal returns can 
be seen as the excess return over the normal return. However, when analyzing the abnormal 
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returns surrounding financial crisis event announcements, the relatively short time period under 
which the financial crisis evolved and the relative proximity of the events make this type of event 
study impractical. Therefore, in this paper, we use a methodology similar to Hippler and Hassan 
(2015), Kabir and Hassan (2005) and Safa, Hasan and Maroney (2012) by using observed market 
returns and priced risk factors to examine how important announcements during the financial 
crisis affect the financial markets, the real sector, and the financial services industry.  For 
example, Hassan and Kabir (2005) use a similar methodology to analyze the effect of the Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis on financial institutions and the effect of the Fed’s 
intervention measures. We use a similar model to analyze the impact of crisis event 
announcements on equity portfolios using the asset pricing risk factors of Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997) and an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation methodology. 
In our first empirical specification, we estimate the model: 
 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝛾𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡, (1) 
where 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is either the equal or valued-weighted return on a portfolio, p, for day t. The 
explanatory variables RF, MRP, SMB, HML, and UMD represent the returns of the risk-free 
Treasury bill, the excess market portfolio, the small-minus-big portfolio, the high-minus-low 
portfolio, and the momentum portfolio of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) on day t, 
respectively. Finally, 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to unity if day t falls within one of the 
four crisis event announcement intervals, as previously defined. Accordingly,  𝛽1 – 𝛽5 represent 
the portfolio returns explained by the asset pricing model, 𝛼 represents the average abnormal 
return for portfolio p, which we expect to equal zero, and 𝛾 represents the abnormal return for 
portfolio p over the reported crisis event announcement interval. 
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In addition, in section 7, we modify Eq. 1 to observe the specific impact of individual crisis event 
announcements on portfolio abnormal returns. Similar to Hassan and Kabir (2005), we calculate 
the abnormal return of portfolio p in response to event i, by estimating the parameters of Eq. 2:      
In Eq. 2, 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 represents the return of portfolio p on day t, and the explanatory factors include 
those specified in Eq. 1; however, the abnormal returns for the 17 crisis events are measured 
using a set of 17 dummy variables, each having a value of one corresponding to each crisis event 
day.  In Eq. 2, 𝛼𝑝 represents the portfolio p’s average abnormal return, which we expect to equal 
zero, and each coefficient for the event dummy variables, 𝛾𝑖, represents the estimate of portfolio 
p’s abnormal return for event day i. 
We estimate the parameters in Eqs. 1 and 2 utilizing an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
econometric estimation procedure. In Section 5, we present the results for estimates of abnormal 
returns for portfolios of financial and non-financial firms, in Section 6, we present the estimates 
for portfolios of firms directly related to the event announcements, and in Section 7, we provide 
estimates of event day abnormal returns for each specific event. 
4. Crisis events and returns 
We identify 17 event announcements surrounding the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, 
which are reported in the September 15, 2013 USA Today article “A Repeat of 2008? Not 
Impossible”.  Table 2.1 summarizes the crisis announcements and their associated dates. 
 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 +∑𝛾𝑖𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
17
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 (2) 
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Table 2.1: Significant Event Dates in the 2007 – 2008 Financial Crisis 
Significant dates and announcements made pertaining to the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 used in this 
study. These dates are identified in the article “A Repeat of 2008? Not Impossible.” from USA Today. 
Event Event Date Event 
Event 1 Feb. 27, 2007 
Mortgage giant Freddie Mac says it will no longer buy the most risky 
subprime loans 
Event 2 Apr. 02, 2007 
Subprime mortgage lender New Century Financial files for bankruptcy court 
protection 
Event 3 Jul. 31, 2007 
Investment bank Bear Stearns liquidates two hedge funds that invested in 
risky securities backed by subprime mortgage loans 
Event 4 Aug. 16, 2007 
Fitch Ratings cuts the credit rating of mortgage lender Countrywide Financial 
to its third lowest investment-grade rating 
Event 5 Jan. 11, 2008 
Bank of America, the largest U.S. bank by market value, agrees to buy 
Countrywide Financial for about $4 billion. 
Event 6 Mar. 16, 2008 
The Federal Reserve agrees to guarantee $30 billion of Bear Stearns’ assets 
in connection with the government sponsored sale of the investment bank to 
JPMorgan Chase 
Event 7 Jul. 11, 2008 
Federal regulators seize IndyMac Federal Bank after it becomes the largest 
regulated thrift to fail 
Event 8 Sep. 07, 2008 
Mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are taken over by the 
government.  
Event 9 Sep. 15, 2008 
Bank of America agrees to purchase Merrill Lynch for $50 billion.  
Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy court protection.  
Event 10 Sep. 16, 2008 
American International Group, the world’s largest insurer, accepts an $85 
billion federal bailout that gives the government a 79.9% stake in the 
company.  
Event 11 Sep. 21, 2008 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last two independent investment 
banks, become bank holding companies, subject to greater regulation by the 
Federal Reserve.  
Event 12 Sep. 25, 2008 
Federal regulators close Washington Mutual Bank and its branches and its 
assets are sold to JPMorgan Chase in the biggest U.S. bank failure history.  
Event 13 Sep. 29, 2008 
Congress rejects a $700 billion Wall Street financial rescue package, known 
as the Troubled Asses Relief Program or TARP, sending the Dow Jones 
Industrial average down 778 points, its single worst point drop ever.  
Event 14 Oct. 03, 2008 Congress passes a revised version of TARP, and President Bush signs it.  
Event 15 Nov. 18, 2008 
Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler executives testify before Congress, 
requesting federal loans from TARP.  
Event 16 Nov. 23, 2008 
The Treasure Department, Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corp. agree to rescue Citigroup with a package of guarantees, funding access, 
and capital. Citigroup will issue preferred shares to the Treasury and FDIC in 
exchange for protection against losses on a $306 billion pool of commercial 
and residential securities it holds 
Event 17 Dec. 19, 2008 
The US Treasury authorizes loans of up to $13.4 billion for GM and $4.0 
billion for Chrysler from TARP. Ford ultimately takes no money. 
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Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of the market portfolio returns on the event day 
intervals under study, as well as those over the entire sample period, January 1, 2006 to 
December 31, 2009. We report market return statistics on the event days as well as the intervals 
surrounding event days. The summary statistics reported in Table 2.2 are reported for both the 
equal and value-weighted market portfolios, as reported by CRSP. 
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Table 2.2: Event Day Market Returns 
                  
Equal and value-weighted CRSP market returns for event days surrounding the financial crisis. Daily CRSP returns are sample from Jan. 1 2006 to Dec. 31, 2009. 
Event returns are based on 17 events identified as being influential to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2008. See Table 2.1 for event day definitions. Event returns are 
calculated over four event intervals: the event day [t=0], the interval beginning the day prior to the event day and continuing through the event day [t=–1, 0], the 
interval beginning the day prior to the event and continuing through the day following the event day [t=–1. +1], and the interval beginning two days prior to the event 
and continuing through the day following the event day [t=–2, +1]. Event interval average daily returns are compared with those of non-event interval returns. 
 CRSP Equal-weight Market Return   CRSP Value-weight Market Return 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.    Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Non-Event Return 0.06 1.52 -8.03 10.74  Non-Event Return 0.03 1.63 -9.00 11.52 
Event Return [t=0] -0.82 2.64 -6.09 6.43  Event Return [t=0] -0.78 3.21 -8.28 6.68 
Diff. 0.89 1.54    Diff. 0.81 1.67   
           
Non-Event Return 0.07 1.51 -8.03 10.74  Non-Event Return 0.03 1.61 -9.00 11.52 
Event Return [t=-1,0] -0.49 2.38 -6.09 6.43  Event Return [t=-1,0] -0.38 2.90 -8.28 6.68 
Diff. 0.55 1.55    Diff. 0.40 1.67   
           
Non-Event Return 0.08 1.47 -8.03 10.74  Non-Event Return 0.04 1.57 -9.00 11.52 
Event Return [t=-1,+1] -0.60 2.55 -6.68 6.43  Event Return [t=-1,+1] -0.43 2.96 -8.28 6.68 
Diff. 0.68 1.54    Diff. 0.47 1.67   
           
Non-Event Return 0.09 1.45 -8.03 10.74  Non-Event Return 0.05 1.55 -9.00 11.52 
Event Return [t=–2,+1] -0.66 2.54 -6.88 6.43  Event Return [t=-2,+1] -0.55 2.90 -8.28 6.68 
Diff. 0.75 1.54       Diff. 0.60 1.66     
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Table 2.2 shows that the average non-event daily market return over the sample under 
study, January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2009, is 0.06 percent per day for the CRSP equal weight 
portfolio and 0.03 percent for the CRSP value weighted portfolio. The standard deviations of the 
daily market returns of the CRSP equal and value weighted portfolios are similar at 1.52 and 
1.63 percent, respectively. In contrast, the average crisis event day market return (t=0) is 
negative. The CRSP equal weight market portfolio fell by an average of 0.82 percent on event 
days, while the CRSP value weighted index fell by 0.78 percent per day. In addition, the standard 
deviation of market returns is significantly higher on event days. Returns for the CRSP equal 
weight portfolio have an event day standard deviation of 2.64 percent, while those of the CRSP 
value weighted portfolio have a standard deviation of 3.21 percent. Statistical tests of equal 
return variances across non-event and event days are rejected at the one percent level. 
Table 2.2 also reports the average crisis event announcement returns for three intervals 
surrounding the event announcements. The results in Table 2.2 for the event announcement 
intervals are similar to those of the event days; however, the average market returns are lowest 
on the actual event announcement days (t=0). Statistical tests for equality of variances among the 
event and non-event days are rejected for all announcement intervals presented in Table 2.2. 
The results presented in Table 2.2 motivate our further analysis of the event interval 
abnormal returns surrounding significant events during the financial crisis. We show that average 
market portfolio returns are lower on days surrounding significant financial crisis events. For 
example, from 2006 to 2009, the CRSP value weighted portfolio yields an average return of 0.03 
percent per day; however, on financial crisis event announcement days, the average reported 
return is -0.78 percent. We continue our analysis of the impact financial crisis event 
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announcements by analyzing whether the lower reported event day returns are explained by 
traditional asset pricing models, or whether the financial crisis appears to signify unpriced risk.      
5. Real sector and financial portfolio event interval abnormal returns 
Despite the fact that many news events during the onset of the financial crisis pertained to 
financial service institutions, the crisis had significant repercussions for both the real and 
financial sectors of the U.S. and global economies. The crisis spurred unprecedented policy 
actions, including monetary policy activity, a real sector stimulus package, government loans and 
bailouts, and an overhaul of U.S. financial regulations. Accordingly, it is important to 
acknowledge the impact that significant crisis events have on both the financial and real sectors 
of the economy. In this section, we examine the abnormal returns surrounding significant events 
of the financial crisis for both financial and real sector firms. In addition, we examine the role 
that firm size plays in the pricing of risk surrounding the financial crisis. Finally, we conduct a 
further analysis of the finance industry to examine how financial crisis events impact different 
financial sub-industries. 
5.1 Event interval abnormal returns for financial and real sector portfolios 
In this section, we examine the abnormal returns surrounding significant events of the 
financial crisis for both financial and real sector firms. We divide the sample of CRSP firms into 
financial and non-financial firms based on reported industry SIC codes. Financial firms are firms 
with an SIC code between 6000 and 6999, and we create equal and value-weighted portfolios of 
financial and non-financial firms using daily CRSP return data. To determine whether real sector 
and financial firms experience abnormal returns during the financial crisis, we employ an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation methodology to the specification provided in Equation 1 
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and estimate the abnormal returns surrounding announcements during the financial crisis for 
equal and value weighted portfolios of real and financial sector firms. Results are presented for 
four specifications, each reporting abnormal returns over different event announcement day 
intervals. 
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows the abnormal return estimations for the portfolio of non-
financial, or real sector, firms. The results exhibit a significant spillover of financial crisis event 
news to the real economy. Many of the events surrounding the financial crisis pertain only to 
firms in the financial services industry and the government’s response to their distress. However, 
Table 2.3 shows that the impact of these events significantly affects the abnormal stock returns 
of real sector firms as well. Panel A of Table 2.3 shows that all event interval dummy variable 
coefficients are negative, and all but one are significant at the ten percent level or better. 
Negative event dummy coefficients imply that, when applying a traditional asset pricing model, 
the portfolios of non-financial, real sector firms experience negative and significant abnormal 
returns in response to financial sector crisis event announcements in the days leading up to and 
immediately after their announcement.
69 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.3: Non-financial and financial portfolio event interval abnormal returns     
OLS estimations of the abnormal returns for real sector and financial portfolios for event intervals surrounding important announcements during the financial 
crisis of 2007 and 2008. See Table 2.1 for event definitions. Daily CRSP returns are sampled from Jan. 1 2006 to Dec. 31, 2009. Dependent variables include the 
equal and value weighted daily portfolio returns. Abnormal returns are calculated using the factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Event interval 
dummy variables estimate event interval abnormal returns. Financial firms are defined by SIC codes between 6000 and 6999. 
Panel A: Non-Financial Portfolios 
Variable VWRET EWRET VWRET EWRET VWRET EWRET VWRET EWRET 
Intercept 0.03861*** 0.10535*** 0.04087*** 0.1095*** 0.04389*** 0.11696*** 0.04438*** 0.12177*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RF -0.0306 -4.45132*** -0.0837 -4.56905*** -0.1503 -4.73207*** -0.1582 -4.8273*** 
 0.970 0.008 0.917 0.006 0.852 0.004 0.844 0.004 
MRP 1.02*** 0.889*** 1.02*** 0.89*** 1.02*** 0.89*** 1.02*** 0.888*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB -0.0164* 0.4917*** -0.0169* 0.4883*** -0.018* 0.4849*** -0.0174* 0.4863*** 
 0.099 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.078 0.000 
HML -0.176*** -0.0465* -0.1754*** -0.044* -0.1754*** -0.0445* -0.1746*** -0.0409* 
 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.094 
UMD 0.0693*** -0.102*** 0.0696*** -0.0997*** 0.0699*** -0.0987*** 0.0699*** -0.0984*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Event [t=0] -0.0265 -0.37311***       
 0.599 0.000 
      
Event [t=-1,0]   -0.06478** -0.27774***     
 
  0.076 0.000     
Event [t=-1,+1]   . . -0.09227*** -0.30919*** . . 
 
  . . 0.002 0.000 . . 
Event [t=-2,+1]   . . . . -0.07824*** -0.30106*** 
      . . . . 0.004 0.000 
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Table 2.3 (continued): Non-financial and financial portfolio event interval abnormal returns    
Panel B: Financial Firm Portfolios 
Variable VWRET EWRET VWRET EWRET VWRET EWRET VWRET EWRET 
Intercept -0.0243 0.0242 -0.0300 0.0232 -0.0340 0.0278 -0.0337 0.0283 
 0.319 0.169 0.222 0.190 0.167 0.117 0.173 0.112 
RF 1.4632 -0.8761 1.6038 -0.8605 1.6907 -0.9640 1.6770 -0.9726 
 0.417 0.499 0.373 0.507 0.347 0.457 0.352 0.453 
MRP 1.01*** 0.687*** 1.01*** 0.688*** 1.01*** 0.688*** 1.011*** 0.687*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.0240 0.195*** 0.0263 0.1942*** 0.0285 0.1929*** 0.0270 0.1935*** 
 0.279 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.222 0.000 
HML 0.6679*** 0.1821*** 0.6659*** 0.1824*** 0.6665*** 0.1827*** 0.6647*** 0.1836*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UMD -0.2156*** -0.1429*** -0.2171*** -0.1424*** -0.2177*** -0.1419*** -0.2176*** -0.1419*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Event [t=0] 0.19957** -0.1134 . . . . . . 
 0.077 0.162 . . . . . . 
Event [t=-1,0]   0.22672*** -0.0327 . . . . 
 
  0.005 0.577 . . . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . . . 0.21986*** -0.09576*** . . 
 . . . . 0.001 0.051 . . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . . . . 0.16819*** -0.08149** 
  . . . . . . 0.005 0.061 
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Table 2.3, Panel A also reports slight differences in the estimated event announcement 
interval abnormal returns between the equal and value weighted portfolios. The equal weighted 
portfolio returns exhibit larger negative abnormal returns and they have lower reported p-values 
than those of the value weighted portfolios. For example, the equal weighted non-financial 
portfolio exhibits negative abnormal returns that are significant at the one percent level across all 
event intervals. In contrast, the event day abnormal returns are negative, but insignificant for the 
event day (t=0) and only significant at the ten percent level for the [–1, 0] interval. In addition, 
while the coefficients for each interval vary within similar ranges, their ranges vary between the 
portfolio construction methods, with the equal-weighted non-financial portfolio exhibiting larger 
negative returns. The differences in the coefficient estimates and their significance level across 
equal and value-weighted portfolios imply that firm size may play role in the abnormal returns 
yielded in response to financial crisis events. 
Panel B of Table 2.3 reports the estimated event interval abnormal returns for the 
portfolio of financial firms, and some key differences in the estimated abnormal returns are 
reported across non-financial and financial firms. Similar to the results reported for real sectors 
firms, the event interval coefficients for the equal-weighted financial portfolio are all negative, 
and those of the two longest intervals leading up to the event day are positive at the ten percent 
levels, with p-values of 0.051 and 0.061, respectively. The negative coefficients reported for the 
event dummy variables for the equal-weighted financial portfolios are consistent with those 
reported for the real sector firms and imply negative financial sector abnormal returns in 
response to important financial crisis announcements. However, the results reported for the 
value-weighted portfolio of financial firms differ from those of the real sector firms reported in 
Panel A. The event interval dummy variable coefficients are positive and significant at the ten 
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percent level or better for all event intervals when value-weighted returns are used as the 
measure of financial portfolio return. The positive and significant event interval coefficients of 
the value-weighted financial portfolio imply positive abnormal returns to financial firms in 
response to the financial crisis event announcements.  
In Table 2.3, we show that the estimated abnormal returns differ slightly across value and equal 
weighted portfolios for real sector firms; however, the difference is pronounced for the financial 
firm portfolios. In fact, the estimated event abnormal returns change signs across equal and value 
weighted portfolios for financial firms. Since firm size, measured by market capitalization, 
explains the difference between the average returns of the value and equal weighted portfolios, 
both sets of results imply that estimated abnormal returns are dependent upon firm size. For both 
real sector and financial firms, the estimated abnormal returns are higher (less negative) for 
value-weighted portfolios, which implies that larger firms yield higher (or zero) abnormal returns 
in response to financial crisis events. In the case of real sector firms, Panel A of Table 2.3 
implies that abnormal returns are less negative (or zero) for larger firms, while Panel B of Table 
2.3 implies that larger financial firms actually experience positive abnormal returns, while 
smaller financial firms exhibit negative (or zero) abnormal returns. We include the impact of 
firm size on estimated abnormal returns in the following sections. 
5.2 Firm size and event interval abnormal returns 
The recent financial crisis brought the term “Too big to fail” to the American lexicon, 
because of the belief that the U.S. government would not allow its largest and most important 
institutions to fail. During the financial crisis, large firms such as Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns collapsed; however, to prevent the further spread of the financial crisis and the associated 
recession, U.S. policymakers enacted a series of programs to support important institutions such 
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as AIG, Citigroup, and the auto industry. However, at first, only large institutions deemed 
important for the stability of the national economic and financial infrastructure were able to 
participate in such programs. Therefore, announcements pertaining to such programs may have a 
different impact on firms of different sizes.  
In the previous section, we show that estimated event interval abnormal returns differ 
across equal and value weighted portfolios, and we suggest that estimated abnormal returns 
differ across firm size, measured by market capitalization. In this section, we examine the effect 
that firm size has on estimated event interval portfolio abnormal returns for the portfolios of non-
financial and financial firms. We analyze the impact of firm size on our previous results by 
creating three equal-weighted, size tercile portfolios sorted daily by market capitalization: small, 
mid, and large. We then apply the same estimation procedure as in the previous section, and the 
results are presented in Table 2.4.  
 
74 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Non-financial and financial size portfolio event interval abnormal returns  
OLS estimations of the abnormal returns for non-financial and financial portfolios for event intervals surrounding important announcements during the financial crisis of 
2007 and 2008. See Table 2.1 for event definitions. Daily CRSP returns are sampled from Jan. 1 2006 to Dec. 31, 2009. Dependent variables include the equal weighted 
daily portfolio returns. Abnormal returns are calculated using the factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Event interval dummy variables estimate event 
interval abnormal returns. Financial firms are defined by SIC codes between 6000 and 6999. Portfolios are divided into small, medium, and large size portfolios based on 
market capitalization. 
 Panel A: Non-financial firm portfolios 
 Small Non-financial Firms Mid-cap Non-financial Firms  Large Non-Financial Firms 
Variable EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Intercept 0.23983*** 0.24864*** 0.26209*** 0.26929*** 0.03649* 0.03758* 0.04171** 0.04703** 0.03996** 0.04252** 0.04736*** 0.0493*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.052 0.032 0.016 0.018 0.012 0.005 0.004 
RF -13.1202*** -13.3781*** -13.6699*** -13.8057*** -0.4260 -0.4551 -0.5467 -0.6598 0.1753 0.1089 0.0021 -0.0350 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.764 0.748 0.700 0.641 0.888 0.930 0.999 0.977 
MRP 0.499*** 0.502*** 0.502*** 0.498*** 1.091*** 1.091*** 1.091*** 1.089*** 1.076*** 1.076*** 1.076*** 1.075*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.2512*** 0.2428*** 0.2359*** 0.2393*** 0.8924*** 0.8918*** 0.8904*** 0.8904*** 0.331*** 0.3296*** 0.3277*** 0.3285*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML -0.0003 0.0056 0.0041 0.0111 -0.0085 -0.0080 -0.0079 -0.0058 -0.1309*** -0.1298*** -0.1299*** -0.1281*** 
 0.996 0.903 0.929 0.809 0.683 0.701 0.705 0.779 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UMD -0.1756 -0.1698 -0.1679 -0.1676 -0.1095 -0.1091 -0.1086 -0.1082 -0.0213 -0.0204 -0.0198 -0.0197 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.054 0.060 0.061 
Event [t=0] -0.92281*** . . . -0.0660 . . . -0.13121* . . . 
 0.000 . . . 0.456 . . . 0.092 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . -0.65342*** . . . -0.0575 . . . -0.12278** . . 
 . 0.000 . . . 0.369 . . . 0.029 . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . -0.66278*** . . . -0.10473** . . . -0.16115*** . 
 . . 0.000 . . . 0.051 . . . 0.001 . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -0.60686*** . . . -0.14755*** . . . -0.14988*** 
  . . . 0.000 . . . 0.002 . . . 0.000 
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Table 2.4 (continued): Non-financial and financial size portfolio event interval abnormal returns        
Panel B: Financial firm portfolios 
 Small Financial Firms Mid-cap Financial Firms Large Financial Firms 
Variable EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Intercept 0.05382* 0.05564** 0.06607** 0.06745** 0.0192 0.0179 0.0236 0.0236 -0.0003 -0.0037 -0.0060 -0.0057 
 0.040 0.035 0.012 0.011 0.391 0.428 0.297 0.300 0.988 0.839 0.747 0.759 
RF -2.4519 -2.5124 -2.7434 -2.7639 -0.6820 -0.6630 -0.7903 -0.7857 0.4938 0.5818 0.6292 0.6190 
 0.203 0.193 0.153 0.150 0.679 0.688 0.632 0.634 0.714 0.666 0.641 0.647 
MRP 0.412*** 0.413*** 0.412*** 0.411*** 0.697*** 0.698*** 0.697*** 0.697*** 0.953*** 0.952*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB -0.0156 -0.0183 -0.0219 -0.0201 0.257*** 0.2557*** 0.254*** 0.2549*** 0.3433*** 0.3448*** 0.3462*** 0.3453*** 
 0.510 0.441 0.354 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML 0.0036 0.0053 0.0055 0.0082 0.1319*** 0.1325*** 0.1328*** 0.1338*** 0.4103*** 0.409*** 0.4094*** 0.4084*** 
 0.899 0.851 0.845 0.771 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UMD -0.1701*** -0.1683*** -0.1671*** -0.1671*** -0.1212*** -0.1204*** -0.1197*** -0.1198*** -0.1375*** -0.1386*** -0.1389*** -0.1388*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Event [t=0] -0.30572*** . . . -0.17852* . . . 0.14537* . . . 
 0.011 . . . 0.084 . . . 0.085 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . -0.19132** . . . -0.0570 . . . 0.15066*** . . 
 . 0.028 . . . 0.445 . . . 0.013 . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . -0.29662*** . . . -0.12959** . . . 0.13878*** . 
 . . 0.000 . . . 0.038 . . . 0.007 . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -0.24886*** . . . -0.1011* . . . 0.10533** 
  . . . 0.000 . . . 0.068 . . . 0.020 
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Table 2.4 shows the impact of firm size, measured by market capitalization, on the 
estimated abnormal event interval returns of real and financial sector portfolios. Table 2.4, Panel 
A shows the estimated event abnormal returns for the size-tercile portfolios of non-financial 
firms. The event interval dummy coefficients are all negative and significant at the one percent 
level for the small capital portfolio, which implies that small real sector firms experience 
negative abnormal returns in response to financial crisis event announcements, even after 
controlling for the small-minus-big portfolio returns of Fama and French (1993). However, as 
implied by previous results, the estimates for the mid and large capital firm portfolios show that 
the estimated abnormal returns for portfolios of larger firms are less pronounced than those of 
the small capital portfolio. All event interval dummy coefficients are negative, and all but two 
are significant at the ten percent level or better; however, the negative abnormal portfolio returns 
of mid and large capital real sector firms are smaller in economic significance than those of the 
small capital portfolios; the small capital real sector portfolio abnormal returns are on the order 
of six times the magnitude of those of the larger portfolios. The results presented in Panels A of 
Table 2.4 expand on previous results and show that non-financial, real sector firms experience 
negative abnormal returns in response to financial crisis event announcements; however, the 
negative abnormal returns are more pronounced from smaller firms. 
Panel B of Table 2.4 examines the impact of firm size on the estimated event interval abnormal 
returns of the equal-weighted financial firm portfolio. We sort financial firms into size-tercile 
portfolios based on market capitalization for each day and estimate event interval abnormal 
returns using the estimation methodology described in previous sections. The first four 
specifications in Panel B of Table 2.4 show the estimated abnormal returns for the portfolio of 
the smallest 33 percent of financial institutions sorted by market capitalization. Consistent with 
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the sample of real sector firms, we report negative event interval dummy variable coefficients, 
and all coefficients are significant at the five percent level or better.  In addition, the estimated 
interval coefficients for the mid cap portfolio are all negative, and all except the [-1, 0] event 
interval are significant at the ten percent level or better.  
In contrast to the results presented for the non-financial portfolios and the small and mid-capital 
portfolios of financial firms, Table 2.4 reports that the event interval dummy variable 
coefficients are all positive and significant at the ten percent level or better for the portfolio of 
large capital financial institutions. Positive and significant event interval dummy variable 
coefficients imply that larger financial institutions experienced positive abnormal returns 
associated with financial crisis event announcements. 
The results reported in Table 2.4 shed interesting insights into how financial crisis and 
intervention news is incorporate into real and financial sector assets prices. As expected, 
portfolios of small and medium sized financial firms exhibit significant negative abnormal 
returns in response to financial crisis event announcements. However, the portfolio of large 
financial institutions does not report significant negative abnormal returns. In fact, Panel B of 
Table 2.4 reports that the portfolio of large financial institutions experience positive and 
significant event interval abnormal return, which imply larger than expected stock returns for 
large financial institutions in response to crisis events. Positive estimated abnormal returns for 
large financial institutions are interesting in the context of the recent 2008 financial crisis. One 
explanation for positive abnormal returns is the financial market’s expectation that larger 
financial institutions are better able to withstand the increased risks associated with the financial 
crisis. However, even large financial institutions, such as Citigroup and AIG, were under 
considerable stress during the financial crisis, to the point where they required Federal 
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government assistance. Therefore, an alternative explanation for large financial firm positive 
abnormal financial crisis event returns is the markets expectation that the largest financial 
institutions would not be allowed to fail. So, while non-financial and smaller financial 
institutions are left to absorb the impact of the financial crisis, the expectation that large financial 
firms would receive government assistance resulted in positive abnormal crisis event returns for 
these firms.  
Moreover, Table 2.4 shows that real sector firms of all sizes report significant negative 
abnormal returns in response to financial crisis event announcements. In addition, the 
magnitudes of the negative estimated abnormal event returns for the portfolio of smaller non-
financial firms are larger than those estimated for financial firms. These results illustrate the 
significant negative spillover effect that financial crisis event announcement have on real sector 
stock returns, and the impact appears to be largest for small firms.   
5.3 Finance sub-industry portfolio abnormal event interval returns 
In this section, we conduct a further examination of the finance industry by analyzing the 
estimated abnormal event announcement returns for portfolios composed of firms in finance 
industry sub-sectors. The financial crisis continues to have a lasting impact on the financial 
services industry; in the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators, policymakers, and the like 
seek to understand the cause of the financial crisis and design new policies with the goal of 
preventing future financial crises of a similar nature. The financial crisis was precipitated by the 
collapse of the housing market, and was exacerbated by failures to absorb the risks posed by 
certain financial products and institutions, such as mortgage backed security derivatives and 
default insurers such as AIG.  Accordingly, some financial institutions and sub-industries were 
more directly involved with the financial crisis than others. In addition, regulations differ across 
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different types of financial firms. For example, depository institutions face capitalization 
requirements and restrictions on asset purchases, while non-depository institutions are allowed 
more self-regulation.  Therefore, understanding how financial crisis events impact the stock 
returns of different types of financial institutions can help stakeholders develop a better 
understanding of financial sector risk. 
We examine the event abnormal returns across finance subindustries by forming 
portfolios of firms in the same two-digit SIC classification. The sample of financial firms is 
divided into seven financial sector sub-industries: broker-dealer, depository, holding-investment, 
insurance brokers, insurance carriers, non-depository credit, and real estate. In addition, in light 
of previous results showing the impact of firm size on abnormal event returns, we also divide the 
sub-industry portfolios into size portfolios and report the results for small and large size sub-
industry portfolios. Table 2.5 reports the event interval abnormal returns for the portfolios of 
financial firm sub-industries and allows for a more detailed examination of the cumulative 
impact of the financial crisis on the financial services industry. The reported regression 
coefficients for the event intervals show that the financial crisis announcements appear to have a 
different impact on different sub-sectors within the financial services industry, as well as 
different  size firms within financial sub-industries. 
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Table 2.5: Financial sub-industry size portfolio event interval abnormal returns    
OLS estimations of the abnormal returns for financial sub-industry portfolios for event day intervals surrounding important announcements during the financial 
crisis of 2007 and 2008. See Table 2.1 for event definitions. Daily CRSP returns are sampled from Jan. 1 2006 to Dec. 31, 2009. Dependent variables include the 
equal weighted daily portfolio returns. Abnormal returns are calculated using the factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Event interval dummy 
variables estimate event day abnormal returns. Financial firms are defined by SIC codes between 6000 and 6999. Portfolios are divided into small, medium, and 
large size portfolios based on market capitalization. Financial firms are divided into sub-industries, based on SIC code: broker-dealer; depository; holding-
investment; insurance brokers; insurance carriers; non-depository credit; and real estate. Pricing model factor coefficients are excluded for space.  
Panel A: Broker-Dealer 
 Small Large 
Variable  EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Event [t=0] -0.73624*** . . . -0.0460 . . . 
 0.005 . . . 0.839 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . -0.38775** . . . -0.0275 . . 
 . 0.043 . . . 0.866 . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . -0.27488* . . . 0.0057 . 
 . . 0.087 . . . 0.967 . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -0.25483* . . . -0.0435 
  . . . 0.074 . . . 0.720 
Panel B: Depository 
 Small Large 
Variable  EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Event [t=0] -0.36058* . . . 0.4551** . . . 
 0.067 . . . 0.034 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . -0.1925 . . . 0.65893*** . . 
 . 0.176 . . . 0.000 . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . -0.35226*** . . . 0.65826*** . 
 . . 0.003 . . . 0.000 . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -0.32606*** . . . 0.63808*** 
  . . . 0.002 . . . 0.000 
Panel C: Holding-Investment 
 Small Large 
Variable  EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Event [t=0] -0.22486** . . . -0.0018 . . . 
 0.050 . . . 0.985 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . -0.15405* . . . -0.0306 . . 
 . 0.063 . . . 0.641 . . 
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Event [t=-1,+1] . . -0.25064*** . . . -0.0518 . 
 . . 0.000 . . . 0.346 . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -0.21055*** . . . -0.0704 
  . . . 0.001 . . . 0.150 
Panel D: Ins Brokers 
 Small Large 
Variable  EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Event [t=0] 0.3772 . . . 0.49316* . . . 
 0.555 . . . 0.051 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . 0.0117 . . . 0.1954 . . 
 . 0.980 . . . 0.284 . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . -0.5746 . . . 0.2388 . 
 . . 0.137 . . . 0.118 . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -0.1338 . . . 0.1296 
  . . . 0.697 . . . 0.340 
 
        
Panel E: Insurance Carriers 
 Small Large 
Variable  EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Event [t=0] -0.1209 . . . 0.36063* . . . 
 0.552 . . . 0.073 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . 0.1437 . . . 0.1616 . . 
 . 0.327 . . . 0.266 . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . 0.0202 . . . 0.1533 . 
 . . 0.870 . . . 0.208 . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -0.0721 . . . 0.0562 
  . . . 0.509 . . . 0.603 
Panel F: Non-dep Credit 
 Small Large 
Variable  EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Event [t=0] -0.7068 . . . -0.3068 . . . 
 0.110 . . . 0.303 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . -0.4235 . . . -0.0490 . . 
 . 0.185 . . . 0.820 . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . -0.4178 . . . 0.2181 . 
 . . 0.118 . . . 0.227 . 
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Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -0.2558 . . . 0.1394 
  . . . 0.282 . . . 0.384 
Panel G: Real Estate 
 Small Large 
Variable  EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Event [t=0] -1.48093*** . . . 0.0884 . . . 
 0.001 . . . 0.691 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . -1.37828*** . . . 0.2061 . . 
 . 0.000 . . . 0.200 . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . -0.56479** . . . -0.1196 . 
 . . 0.044 . . . 0.375 . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -0.3071 . . . -0.1936 
  . . . 0.218 . . . 0.105 
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Panels A, B, C, and G of Table 2.5 show that smaller financial firms across four of the 
financial sub-industries are negatively impacted by financial crisis event announcements. The 
event interval announcement coefficients for broker-dealer, depository, holding-investment, and 
real estate firms are all negative, and a majority of the event intervals are statistically significant 
at the ten percent level or better, implying that these types of financial firms drive the small 
financial portfolio negative returns reported in Table 2.4. On the other hand, the estimated 
abnormal return coefficients are not negative and significant for the portfolios of larger financial 
firms. In fact, consistent with previous results, the estimated abnormal return coefficients are 
positive and significant for large depository institutions, and the coefficients are significant at the 
five percent level or better. To a lesser extent, insurance brokers and insurance carriers exhibit 
some positive abnormal returns as well, as the event day abnormal return coefficients (t=0) are 
positive and significant at the ten percent level. No other event intervals exhibit statistically 
significant abnormal returns for financial two-digit SIC industry portfolios. 
The results presented in Table 2.5 expand on our results reporting negative crisis event 
interval abnormal returns for small financial firms, but positive abnormal returns for large 
financial institutions. By estimating abnormal returns for different size portfolios consisting of 
firms in different financial sub-industries, we show that small broker-dealer, depository, holding-
investment, and real estate firms all experience significant negative abnormal returns in response 
to financial crisis events announcements, which corresponds to the fact that weaknesses in the 
real estate and financial markets likely to negatively affect these firms are revealed during crisis 
event announcements. However, results also show that large depository institutions and, to a 
lesser extent, large insurance companies, exhibited positive event interval abnormal returns in 
response to financial crisis announcements. Positive abnormal portfolio returns for large 
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depository and insurance firms are consistent with expectations these firms are relatively less 
risky, given the fact that the Federal government is unlikely to let large financial intuitions fail. 
Indeed, large banks, such as Citigroup, and large insurance carriers, such as AIG, were given 
substantial assistance during the financial crisis. 
6. Event Portfolio Abnormal Returns 
As an extension of our analysis, we examine the event interval abnormal returns of a portfolio of 
firms directly associated with the announcement events identified in our study. To construct the 
portfolio of event firms, we identify all the firms associated with the event announcements 
defined in Table 2.1 by their stock ticker symbol during the sample period. We then construct 
equal and value weighted portfolios consisting of these firms, which include the following 17 
firms: Freddie Mac, New Century Financial, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, Bank of America, J.P. 
Morgan Chase, IndyMac, Fannie Mae, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, American International 
Group (AIG), Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual, Ford, General Motors, and 
Chrysler.  
Table 2.6 reports the estimated event interval abnormal returns for the equal weighted, 
size-tercile portfolios of the firms directly impacted by the identified financial crisis 
announcements. The results reporting the abnormal returns for the portfolio of event firms and 
the role that firm size in the magnitude and direction of reported abnormal returns are similar to 
those reported for the portfolio of financial firms in Table 2.4, which is not surprising, 
considering a majority of the event firms are in the financial sector.  
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Table 2.6: Event firm size portfolio event interval abnormal returns     
OLS estimations of the abnormal returns for event-related firm portfolios for event intervals surrounding important announcements during the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. 
See Table 2.1 for event definitions. Daily CRSP returns are sampled from Jan. 1 2006 to Dec. 31, 2009. Dependent variables include the equal weighted daily portfolio returns. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Event interval dummy variables estimate event interval abnormal returns. Event 
related firms include Freddie Mac, New Century Financial, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, IndyMac, Fannie Mae, Merrill Lynch, Lehman 
Brothers, American International Group (AIG), Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual, Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. 
 Small Event Firms Medium Event Firms Large Event Firms 
Variable EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Intercept -0.0374 -0.0060 -0.0456 -0.0438 -0.1389 -0.1232 -0.1271 -0.1471 0.0036 -0.0177 -0.0292 -0.0287 
 0.903 0.984 0.883 0.888 0.273 0.333 0.320 0.252 0.966 0.834 0.730 0.736 
RF -4.7717 -5.8285 -4.8896 -4.8723 2.8889 2.5318 2.6257 3.0704 0.0517 0.5479 0.7975 0.7670 
 0.832 0.796 0.829 0.830 0.757 0.786 0.779 0.743 0.993 0.929 0.897 0.901 
MRP 0.92*** 0.941*** 0.948*** 0.94*** 1.526*** 1.525*** 1.525*** 1.528*** 1.137*** 1.139*** 1.139*** 1.142*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.0493 0.0015 -0.0076 0.0037 -0.4935*** -0.4954*** -0.4964*** -0.4923*** -0.4269*** -0.4228*** -0.4168*** -0.4208*** 
 0.859 0.996 0.978 0.989 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML 0.9149*** 0.946*** 0.9274*** 0.942*** 0.6325*** 0.6356*** 0.6336*** 0.6307*** 1.7361*** 1.7311*** 1.7325*** 1.7279*** 
 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UMD -1.2959*** -1.2627*** -1.2637*** -1.2646*** -0.7519*** -0.7507*** -0.7508*** -0.7527*** -0.5845*** -0.5872*** -0.5889*** -0.5885*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Event [t=0] -5.54449*** . . . 0.0014 . . . 0.1940 . . . 
 0.000 . . . 0.998 . . . 0.616 . . . 
Event [t=-1,0] . -3.42978*** . . . -0.3590 . . . 0.58233** . . 
 . 0.001 . . . 0.394 . . . 0.037 . . 
Event [t=-1,+1] . . -1.73843** . . . -0.1851 . . . 0.58334*** . 
 . . 0.043 . . . 0.600 . . . 0.013 . 
Event [t=-2,+1] . . . -1.38115* . . . 0.1026 . . . 0.44953** 
  . . . 0.070 . . . 0.743 . . . 0.030 
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Table 2.6 reports negative and significant event interval coefficients over all estimation 
intervals for the portfolio of small event firms, implying that the smallest of the firms directly 
impacted by the event announcements experienced negative abnormal returns in response to 
those announcements.  In addition, the magnitude of the estimates abnormal returns are larger 
than those reported by the portfolios of small financial and non-financial firms reported in Table 
2.4. So, although our previous results indicate that real sector small cap firms experience lower 
abnormal event interval returns than financial sector firms, an extension of the analysis shows 
that the portfolio of the smallest event firms experience the largest negative abnormal returns in 
response to financial crisis event announcements.  
However, in contrast the results pertaining to the small cap portfolio of event firms, and 
consistent with results presented for financial firms, Table 2.6 reports that the portfolio of the 
largest firms directly linked to the event announcements exhibit positive and significant event 
interval coefficients for the three longest event intervals, which implies that positive abnormal 
returns were achieved by large firms that were directly associated with the financial crisis event 
announcements.  
The results presented in Table 2.6 present interest insights into the abnormal event 
interval returns seen by firms directly related to the financial crisis in the context of the recent 
financial crisis and the actions taken to curtail the crisis. Estimated negative event interval 
abnormal returns for smaller event-related firms, but positive abnormal returns for larger event-
related firms are consistent with many of the event that took place during the financial crisis. For 
example, many of the larger financial institutions, such as AIG were given substantial help by 
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the Federal government in order to prevent their failure, and, consequently, we report positive 
abnormal returns for the portfolio of large event firms. On the other hand, relatively smaller 
firms, such as Lehman Brothers and New Century Financial were allowed to fail, and 
consequently, we report negative abnormal returns for the portfolio of small firms. In addition, as 
part of the negotiations between troubled firms and regulators in an attempt to end the financial 
crisis, agreements were reached for some larger firms to acquire the smaller and weaker firms. 
For example, Bank of America agreed to purchase Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, while 
Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns were purchased by JP Morgan Chase.  The purchase 
arrangements signaled weaknesses in the firms being purchased and allowed to acquiring firms 
to purchase distressed assets at lower costs. Consequently, we report abnormal returns consistent 
with these activities, with larger firms achieving positive abnormal event interval announcements 
and smaller firm achieving negative returns. 
7. Event Day Portfolio Abnormal Returns 
In previous results, we show that real sector, financial, and event firms all exhibit statistically 
significant event interval abnormal returns in response to financial crisis event announcements. 
In addition, we provide evidence with respect to which types of firms exhibit abnormal returns in 
response to announcements pertaining to the financial crisis. As an extension of the analysis of 
event interval returns, we now examine the impact of particular events on the abnormal returns 
of real, financial, and event firm stock portfolios. In an empirical analysis we apply the asset 
pricing model of Fama and French (1993) and test for the presence of event day abnormal returns 
by estimating the coefficients of Equation 2 using the methodology described in Section 4. The 
resulting dummy variable coefficients representing each event day estimate the abnormal return 
of a given portfolio in response to a particular financial crisis event announcement. In section 
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7.1, we estimate event day abnormal returns for portfolios of real sector, financial, and event 
firms, as defined in previous analyses. Then, in Section 7.2 we extend the analysis to the two-
digit SIC code financial sector sub-industries, in a fashion similar to that presented in Section 
5.2. The resulting analyses provide more robust evidence regarding the pricing of financial risk 
into the returns of portfolios having different characteristics. In addition, this analysis sheds 
lights on the types of crisis and intervention events that result in returns that are not priced by 
standard asset pricing models. 
7.1 Real sector, financial and event firm abnormal event day returns 
Table 2.7 reports the estimated event day abnormal returns for each financial crisis event 
announcement for financial and non-financial portfolios. Similar to previous results, both real 
sector and financial sector firms exhibit significant event day abnormal returns in response to 
financial crisis announcements; however, not all events report statistically significant abnormal 
returns.  
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Table 2.7: Non-financial and financial firm portfolio event day abnormal returns     
OLS estimations of the abnormal returns for non-financial and financial portfolios for event days surrounding important announcements 
during the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. See Table 2.1 for event definitions. Daily CRSP returns are sampled from Jan. 1 2006 to Dec. 
31, 2009. Dependent variables include the equal weighted daily portfolio returns. Abnormal returns are calculated using the factors of 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Event day dummy variables estimate event day abnormal returns. Financial firms are defined 
by SIC codes between 6000 and 6999. Portfolios are divided into small, medium, and large size portfolios based on market capitalization. 
 Non-Financial Firms Financial Firms 
 Small Mid Large Small Mid Large 
Variable EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Intercept 0.23998*** 0.03645* 0.04071** 0.05597** 0.0212 0.0000 
 0.000 0.052 0.014 0.031 0.339 0.999 
RF -13.1587*** -0.4110 0.1185 -2.6392 -0.8542 0.4837 
 0.000 0.767 0.923 0.168 0.602 0.719 
MRP 0.502*** 1.091*** 1.077*** 0.415*** 0.699*** 0.955*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.2599*** 0.8928*** 0.3319*** -0.0129 0.2596*** 0.3383*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.591 0.000 0.000 
HML 0.0321 -0.0006 -0.1239*** 0.0175 0.1449*** 0.4186*** 
 0.489 0.979 0.000 0.540 0.000 0.000 
UMD -0.1734*** -0.1034*** -0.0150 -0.1615*** -0.114*** -0.1293*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Event 1 -1.55226** -0.4362 0.1939 0.0303 0.2199 0.1723 
 0.049 0.217 0.533 0.950 0.598 0.614 
Event 2 0.0517 -0.0064 0.3142 0.0419 -0.1370 -0.1780 
 0.948 0.986 0.311 0.931 0.741 0.601 
Event 3 0.7296 0.5660 0.3495 0.4586 0.3407 0.2514 
 0.353 0.108 0.259 0.344 0.412 0.461 
Event 4 -3.80594*** -0.8999** -1.24428*** -1.58052*** -0.5755 0.73954** 
 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.167 0.031 
Event 5 0.2864 -0.3028 0.0005 0.4756 0.0458 0.4208 
 0.716 0.390 0.999 0.327 0.912 0.217 
Event 6 -1.53724* -0.2403 -0.66307** -1.15547** -0.5004 -0.6473* 
 0.051 0.495 0.033 0.018 0.229 0.058 
Event 7 -0.4843 0.58426* 0.0013 -0.1118 0.2843 0.2659 
 0.539 0.097 0.997 0.818 0.494 0.436 
Event 8 -2.29253*** -0.2368 -0.8718*** -0.80887* -0.4676 -0.2966 
 0.004 0.502 0.005 0.096 0.261 0.385 
Event 9 -1.1101 -0.3571 -0.3021 -0.4168 -0.4032 0.3225 
 0.161 0.313 0.333 0.393 0.335 0.347 
Event 10 -2.7172*** -0.75879** -0.51523* -1.59418*** -1.71718*** -0.57872* 
 0.001 0.032 0.098 0.001 0.000 0.091 
Event 11 1.47378* 1.48068*** 0.68545** 0.4510 0.6803 -0.1244 
 0.063 0.000 0.028 0.356 0.104 0.717 
Event 12 -0.9368 0.0902 -0.1651 0.1277 0.1886 -0.2941 
 0.234 0.798 0.595 0.793 0.650 0.389 
Event 13 -0.0500 -0.0397 0.0147 -0.0010 -0.6773 0.2993 
 0.951 0.913 0.963 0.998 0.113 0.393 
Event 14 0.0819 -0.2871 -0.4588 0.3578 0.5377 0.7694** 
 0.917 0.415 0.140 0.461 0.196 0.024 
Event 15 -0.3189 -1.43963*** -0.91106*** -1.70558*** -1.60862*** -0.5012 
 0.686 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.143 
Event 16 -1.1580 1.45441*** 1.25958*** 0.7250 0.1166 1.02871*** 
 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.782 0.003 
Event 17 -2.27427*** -0.2865 0.0939 -0.4500 0.6618 0.86036** 
  0.004 0.416 0.762 0.354 0.111 0.012 
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Table 2.7 reports negative and significant coefficients corresponding to Event 4, the 
downgrading of Countrywide’s credit rating, for real sector firms of all sizes, as well as for small 
financial institutions.  The coefficients for Event 6, which corresponds to the government 
backing of Bear Stearns, are also all negative and are significant at the ten percent level or better 
for the smallest and largest-sized real sector and financial firms. The coefficients for Event 8, 
which corresponds to the government takeover of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, are negative and 
are significant at the ten percent level for small and large real sector firms, as well as small 
financial institutions. Similarly, the coefficients for Event 10, corresponding to the 
announcement of the government bailout of AIG, are negative and significant at the ten percent 
level or better for both real sector and financial firms of all sizes. Finally, the coefficients for 
Event 15, which corresponds to requests from the big three U.S. automakers for government 
financial assistance, are negative and significant at the ten percent level or better for larger real 
sector firms and smaller financial institutions.  
There are, however, some financial crisis event announcements that correspond to 
significant positive abnormal portfolio returns, particularly for larger firms. For example, the 
Event 4 coefficient, which corresponds with the downgrade of Countrywide’s credit rating and is 
negative for real sector firms of all sizes, is positive and significant for the largest 33 percent of 
financial institutions. In addition, the coefficients for Event 11, which correspond to the 
announcements of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley becoming bank holding companies, are 
positive and significant at the ten percent level or better for real sector firms of all sizes. 
However, the coefficients are not statistically different from zero for the sample of financial 
institutions. Finally, the coefficients for Event 16, which corresponds to the announcement of the 
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Federal government’s rescue of Citigroup, are positive and significant at the ten percent level or 
better for larger non-financial sector firms and financial institutions.  
In Table 2.8, we report the estimates of abnormal event day returns for firms directly 
associated with the event announcements, as defined in section 6, and results are similar to those 
reported in previous tables. 
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Table 2.8: Event firm size portfolio event day abnormal returns   
OLS estimations of the abnormal returns for non-financial and financial portfolios for event days surrounding 
important announcements during the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. See Table 2.1 for event definitions. Daily 
CRSP returns are sampled from Jan. 1 2006 to Dec. 31, 2009. Dependent variables include the equal weighted daily 
portfolio returns. Abnormal returns are calculated using the factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). 
Event day dummy variables estimate event day abnormal returns. Portfolios are divided into small, medium, and 
large size portfolios based on market capitalization. Event related firms include Freddie Mac, New Century 
Financial, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, IndyMac, Fannie Mae, Merrill Lynch, 
Lehman Brothers, American International Group (AIG), Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual, 
Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. 
 Small Mid Large 
Variable EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Intercept -0.0137 -0.1280 0.0015 
 0.962 0.302 0.986 
RF -6.9927 1.9670 0.3200 
 0.743 0.830 0.959 
MRP 0.941*** 1.54*** 1.141*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.0011 -0.4749*** -0.4279*** 
 0.997 0.000 0.000 
HML 1.2718*** 0.709*** 1.7554*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UMD -1.2187*** -0.7*** -0.5532*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Event 1 -0.4007 1.7203 -0.5336 
 0.941 0.461 0.734 
Event 2 -0.1964 -0.2282 -0.0787 
 0.971 0.922 0.960 
Event 3 -0.6341 -0.7424 0.1854 
 0.907 0.750 0.906 
Event 4 -3.6372 3.5264 0.8576 
 0.503 0.131 0.584 
Event 5 -4.6852 4.4674* 0.0287 
 0.387 0.055 0.985 
Event 6 -22.6147*** -4.2371* -0.1089 
 0.000 0.069 0.945 
Event 7 -0.0419 -3.5164 0.1453 
 0.994 0.132 0.926 
Event 8 -50.1223*** -5.9181** -1.8478 
 0.000 0.011 0.238 
Event 9 -27.8057*** -7.8376*** -3.1374** 
 0.000 0.001 0.046 
Event 10 -2.5615 -0.7816 -2.4171 
 0.637 0.738 0.123 
Event 11 26.3259*** 11.088*** 2.3680 
 0.000 0.000 0.132 
Event 12 -8.0546 -4.7157** -0.9069 
 0.137 0.043 0.562 
Event 13 3.4811 1.7124 3.1758** 
 0.532 0.474 0.048 
Event 14 -5.2586 1.6564 -0.7841 
 0.332 0.477 0.616 
Event 15 7.8629 0.6789 -0.3530 
 0.148 0.771 0.822 
Event 16 -5.6252 5.2772** 7.3358*** 
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Table 2.8 reports negative coefficients for Event 6 for all event firm size portfolios, and 
the coefficients are significant for small and mid-sized event firm portfolios, which corresponds 
to negative abnormal returns in response to the government’s rescue of Bear Stearns. Similarly, 
the coefficients for Event 8, which corresponds to the takeover of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, 
are negative for all event firm size portfolios and are significant at the ten percent level for the 
small and medium sized event firm portfolios. In addition, the coefficients for event 9, which 
corresponds with the announcement of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, are negative and 
significant for all event firm size portfolios.  
Similar to the portfolios of non-financial firms, the coefficients for Event 11, which 
correspond to the announcements of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley becoming bank 
holding companies, are positive and significant at the ten percent level or better for small and 
mid-sized event firm portfolios. In addition, the coefficients for Event 16, which corresponds to 
the announcement of the Federal government’s bailout of Citigroup, are positive and significant 
at the ten percent level or better for the middle and large sized portfolios of event firms.  
In addition, consistent with previous result presented in Table 2.6, the magnitude of the 
estimated event portfolio event day abnormal returns are much larger than those estimated for the 
financial and non-financial portfolios in Table 2.7. Larger estimated event returns imply that 
financial crisis announcement have the largest impact on portfolio of firms that are directly 
associated the announcements.  
 
 0.306 0.026 0.000 
Event 17 0.5446 -1.9613 -0.5850 
  0.920 0.400 0.708 
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7.2 Financial sector sub-industry event day abnormal returns 
In this section, we extend our analysis of the impact of individual event announcements 
to further examination of the finance industry. We create portfolios of different types of financial 
firms in order to test whether the impact of the event announcements under study have a 
homogeneous effect across all financial firms. Accordingly, abnormal event day returns are 
estimated for the two-digit SIC industry portfolios. 
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Table 2.9: Finance sub-industry size portfolio abnormal event day returns  
OLS estimations of the abnormal returns for non-financial and financial portfolios for event days surrounding important announcements during the financial 
crisis of 2007 and 2008. See Table 2.1 for event definitions. Daily CRSP returns are sampled from Jan. 1 2006 to Dec. 31, 2009. Dependent variables include 
the equal weighted daily portfolio returns. Abnormal returns are calculated using the factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Event day dummy 
variables estimate event day abnormal returns. Financial firms are defined by SIC codes between 6000 and 6999. Portfolios are divided into small, medium, and 
large size portfolios based on market capitalization. 
 Panel A: Small financial sub-industry portfolios 
 Broker-Dealer Depository Holding-Investment Ins Brokers Ins Carriers Non-dep Credit Real Estate 
Variable EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Intercept 0.19883*** 0.07902* 0.04453* 0.0635 0.12996*** 0.1865* 0.33283*** 
 0.000 0.063 0.067 0.647 0.003 0.051 0.001 
RF -8.7128** -5.2835* -1.5059 1.7382 -5.9112* -12.8234* -18.4247** 
 0.037 0.092 0.401 0.865 0.067 0.070 0.013 
MRP 0.8242*** 0.1371*** 0.5302*** 0.8478*** 0.7733*** 0.5117*** 0.3802*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.4726*** -0.0278 -0.0220 0.8738*** 0.6359*** 0.2049** 0.1318 
 0.000 0.479 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.154 
HML 0.2392*** 0.0805* -0.0452* -0.1073 0.3822*** 0.3645*** 0.3067*** 
 0.000 0.086 0.093 0.484 0.000 0.001 0.006 
UMD -0.1868*** -0.266*** -0.1089*** -0.3945*** -0.1772*** -0.3477*** -0.2563*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Event 1 -0.1017 0.0604 0.0506 1.1329 0.5059 0.4789 -0.9764 
 0.924 0.940 0.912 0.664 0.538 0.790 0.603 
Event 2 -0.3721 0.0634 0.0918 -0.0841 -0.1090 -0.3891 -0.7998 
 0.725 0.936 0.840 0.974 0.894 0.828 0.669 
Event 3 -0.0973 1.0434 0.2951 3.4885 0.2456 -0.5146 -0.7483 
 0.927 0.190 0.517 0.180 0.764 0.774 0.689 
Event 4 -0.1326 -1.2190 -1.61802*** 2.3991 -0.3507 -2.3448 -4.7728** 
 0.901 0.127 0.000 0.358 0.669 0.192 0.011 
Event 5 0.4939 0.9017 0.2852 -5.7272** 1.0544 1.2578 -0.1987 
 0.641 0.257 0.531 0.028 0.198 0.483 0.915 
Event 6 -3.18844*** -1.2932 -0.86436* 2.3332 -1.55798* -0.6597 -5.17869*** 
 0.003 0.105 0.058 0.370 0.057 0.713 0.006 
Event 7 0.3239 -0.5071 0.0237 0.1552 -1.90553** 2.8226 0.6721 
 0.760 0.525 0.959 0.952 0.020 0.116 0.720 
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Event 8 -1.3103 -1.4691 -0.3634 -2.7278 -1.0438 -3.3599* -0.3451 
 0.217 0.066 0.425 0.295 0.203 0.061 0.854 
Event 9 -4.70964*** -1.0392 -0.2402 -1.0550 0.3469 -4.38285** 1.1494 
 0.000 0.195 0.600 0.687 0.674 0.015 0.541 
Event 10 -3.22967*** -0.7835 -1.69685*** -2.3615 -1.1790 -2.1349 -1.9453 
 0.002 0.327 0.000 0.366 0.152 0.235 0.300 
Event 11 2.99648*** -0.1492 0.5309 1.7633 2.35482*** -3.63818** 0.6669 
 0.005 0.852 0.247 0.501 0.004 0.044 0.723 
Event 12 0.0537 0.6518 -0.0111 -1.6722 0.0483 2.5678 0.1502 
 0.960 0.413 0.981 0.521 0.953 0.152 0.936 
Event 13 -1.8135* 1.879** -0.3354 5.6661** 0.9410 1.7140 -1.1851 
 0.096 0.022 0.473 0.034 0.264 0.352 0.538 
Event 14 1.5500 1.1684 -0.0906 -1.6423 2.03689** 1.6248 -1.7472 
 0.144 0.143 0.842 0.528 0.013 0.365 0.351 
Event 15 -1.6295 -0.6990 -2.28391*** 1.8073 -2.06039** -3.22643* 2.5433 
 0.126 0.381 0.000 0.488 0.012 0.073 0.175 
Event 16 0.5956 -2.2078*** 1.8676*** -2.3558 0.5002 1.5897 -7.7796*** 
 0.580 0.006 0.000 0.372 0.547 0.382 0.000 
Event 17 -2.0267* -2.3802*** 0.5510 5.7595** -1.7356** -3.4326* -4.5448** 
  0.056 0.003 0.226 0.027 0.034 0.056 0.015 
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Table 2.9 (continued):  Finance sub-industry size portfolio abnormal event day returns   
Panel B: Large financial sub-industry portfolios 
 Broker-Dealer Depository 
Holding-
Investment Ins Brokers 
Insurance 
Carriers Non-dep Credit Real Estate 
Variable EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET EWRET 
Intercept -0.0319 -0.0820 0.0219 -0.0176 0.0201 -0.0136 0.0032 
 0.507 0.076 0.256 0.748 0.646 0.830 0.947 
RF 3.8779 4.1214 -0.2136 0.6795 -1.7359 -2.2433 -0.0242 
 0.276 0.227 0.881 0.867 0.591 0.632 0.995 
MRP 1.3348*** 1.0482*** 0.8391*** 0.8369*** 1.026*** 1.1165*** 1.1918*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.3249*** 0.7717*** 0.1774*** 0.24*** -0.1022*** 0.4177*** 0.6918*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 
HML 0.3995*** 0.9411*** 0.1901*** 0.4574*** 0.6482*** 0.7262*** 0.3194*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UMD -0.2793*** -0.2686*** -0.0611*** -0.0967*** -0.1133*** -0.4938*** -0.2156*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Event 1 0.2391 0.2937 -0.0492 0.5259 1.0064 0.6871 1.66636* 
 0.792 0.735 0.892 0.611 0.221 0.564 0.066 
Event 2 -0.0441 -0.9745 0.1689 -0.6231 -0.0857 -0.2318 -0.2328 
 0.961 0.260 0.640 0.545 0.917 0.845 0.797 
Event 3 -0.4070 -0.2605 0.5887 0.9534 -0.0147 -1.1406 0.4727 
 0.652 0.763 0.103 0.354 0.986 0.336 0.601 
Event 4 0.0781 3.65987*** -0.3809 -0.6905 0.5654 0.8646 -0.4983 
 0.931 0.000 0.293 0.504 0.492 0.468 0.583 
Event 5 0.6269 -0.6788 0.5899 -0.2135 0.0328 1.6460 -0.8087 
 0.487 0.433 0.103 0.836 0.968 0.166 0.371 
Event 6 -4.95733*** 0.4362 -0.5006 0.7111 -0.5228 -1.7130 -0.1530 
 0.000 0.614 0.166 0.490 0.524 0.150 0.866 
Event 7 -0.8175 1.0905 0.2726 -0.1366 -0.1186 0.5036 -0.0386 
 0.366 0.208 0.451 0.895 0.885 0.672 0.966 
Event 8 -0.2459 0.8967 -0.3487 -0.9301 -0.0610 -8.3223*** -0.6329 
 0.786 0.301 0.335 0.367 0.941 0.000 0.485 
Event 9 2.18336** 1.60288* -0.4242 0.3623 1.9377** -0.3557 -1.4494 
 0.016 0.066 0.243 0.727 0.019 0.766 0.112 
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Event 10 2.06976** 2.08733** -1.64632*** 0.7786 -0.2031 -1.3621 -0.5720 
 0.022 0.016 0.000 0.451 0.805 0.253 0.529 
Event 11 -1.78948** -1.2534 0.1757 1.6674 -0.2713 3.07516* -0.9709 
 0.049 0.150 0.629 0.108 0.742 0.010 0.286 
Event 12 -1.2003 -0.6827 0.0674 1.1919 -0.6319 -1.5597 0.2487 
 0.184 0.431 0.852 0.248 0.441 0.189 0.784 
Event 13 0.1217 0.0594 -0.1802 1.3735 1.8639** 1.7167 1.5074 
 0.896 0.947 0.627 0.195 0.027 0.160 0.105 
Event 14 1.2534 2.69068*** -0.0672 2.5875** 1.51994* 0.1135 -1.5896* 
 0.166 0.002 0.853 0.012 0.064 0.924 0.079 
Event 15 -0.7018 0.7860 -1.12586*** -1.1875 0.4730 -0.6060 0.4167 
 0.438 0.365 0.002 0.250 0.565 0.611 0.646 
Event 16 2.5234*** -1.2019 1.3727*** 1.3003 -0.2692 1.6653 2.3114** 
 0.006 0.171 0.000 0.214 0.746 0.167 0.012 
Event 17 0.2983 -0.7939 1.4629*** 0.7836 1.0863 0.0907 1.8525** 
  0.741 0.359 0.000 0.447 0.186 0.939 0.041 
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Table 2.9 reports the estimation of the event day abnormal returns for important 
announcements surrounding the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 across seven sub-industries of 
the financial services sector: broker-dealers, depository institutions, holding-investment firms, 
insurance brokers, insurance carriers, non-depository credit institutions, and real estate firms. 
Many news events during the financial crisis pertained to specific types of assets or involved 
specific companies in specific segments of the financial industry. An analysis of the impact of 
financial crisis news events on the abnormal returns of specific types of financial institutions 
allows us to analyze potential differences in stock price reactions across financial sub-industries.  
Similar to previous findings, many of the identified financial crisis event announcements 
correspond with negative estimated abnormal financial portfolio stock returns, and smaller 
financial firms are particularly impacted. The coefficients for Event 4 are negative and 
significant for smaller holding-investment companies and real estate firms, which correspond to 
negative abnormal returns in response to the downgrade of Countrywide’s credit rating.  The 
Event 6 dummy variable corresponds with the government rescue of Bear Sterns and is similarly 
negative and significant for small broker-dealer, holding-investment companies, insurance 
carriers, and real estate firms. The Event 6 coefficient is also negative an significant for the 
portfolio of large broker-dealer firms. The estimated abnormal returns in response to the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy announcement, Event 9, are negative and significant for small broker-
dealer, and non-depository credit institutions. The coefficient for Event 10, the government 
bailout of AIG, is negative and significant for small broker-dealer and holding-investment 
companies, as well as larger holding-investment companies. The Event 11 dummy variables, 
corresponding to the conversion of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley into investment 
companies, report negative and significant coefficients for the portfolios of small non-depository 
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credit and large broker dealers firms. The coefficient for Event 13, the initial rejection of the 
government bailout package by Congress, is negative and significant for the portfolio of small 
broker dealer firms. The impact of the eventual passing the revised bailout package, measured by 
the coefficient for Event 14, is negative and significant for large real estate firms. The reported 
abnormal returns for Event 15, the request by the major U.S. auto manufacturers to access TARP 
funds, are negative and significant for small holding-investment, insurance carriers, and non-
depository firms, as well as large holding-investment companies. The coefficients for Event 16, 
which correspond to the government rescue of Citigroup, are negative and significant for small 
depository and real estate firm portfolios. Finally, the coefficients corresponding to Event 17, 
Congressional approval for TARP loans to the major U.S. auto manufacturers, are negative and 
significant for all small financial institutions, except holding-investment companies. 
In contrast, consistent with prior evidence, we also estimate positive estimated abnormal 
portfolio returns in response to some financial crisis event announcements for certain portfolios 
of financial institutions, and these positive abnormal returns are generally yielded by larger 
financial institutions. Specifically, the coefficient for Event 4, corresponding to the downgrading 
of Countrywide’s credit rating, is positive and significant for large depository institutions. The 
Event 9 dummy variables, which correspond to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy announcement, 
also report positive and significant coefficients for the large broker-dealer, depository institution, 
and insurance carrier portfolios. The estimated abnormal returns in response to the government 
rescue of AIG, the coefficients for Event 10, are positive and significant for the large broker-
dealer and depository firm portfolios. The coefficients associated with Event 11, the conversion 
of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley into holding companies, are positive and significant for 
small broker dealer and insurance carriers, as well as the large non-depository credit institution 
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portfolio. The coefficients for Event 13, which corresponds to the initial rejection of the TARP 
program, are positive and significant for small depository and insurance brokers, and large 
insurance carriers. The Event 14 dummy variable coefficients, indicating abnormal returns in 
response to the passing of the TARP program, are positive and significant for small insurance 
carriers as well as the large depository institution, insurance broker, and insurance carrier 
portfolios. The reported coefficients for Event 16, the government rescue of Citigroup, are 
positive and significant for small holding-investment firms, as well as the large brokerage, 
holding-investment and real estate firm portfolios. Finally, the coefficients corresponding to 
Event 17, the approval of the inclusion of the major automakers into the TARP program, are 
positive and significant for large holding-investment and real estate firm portfolios. 
8. Conclusion 
The financial crisis began to present in the financial markets in February of 2007 with an 
increase in defaults in subprime mortgages, and the financial crisis spread throughout the 
economy as important news came to light throughout 2007 and 2008. In response to the crisis, 
the Federal Reserve and other Federal agencies and policymakers began to implement policies 
aimed at curtailing the crisis. The Fed enacted typical monetary policy to slow the crisis, but 
soon had to resort to unconventional approaches. The Fed began to create new facilities, changed 
its lending rules, and even injected large amounts of capital into financial institutions to 
overcome the crisis. The Fed’s interventions were established to improve the entire financial 
system and the U.S. economy in general. The impact of the financial crisis and the effect that 
policymakers had on its severity and duration is an important issue, and we add to the empirical 
literature on the subject. 
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In this paper, we examine the impact of news announcements related to the financial 
crisis on the abnormal stock returns of real sector and financial firms. We identify 17 important 
financial crisis events from the USA Today article “A Repeat of 2008? Not Impossible” that 
conveyed important information about the evolution of the financial crisis. On the event days 
under study, the value-weighted CRSP market return averages -0.78 percent per day, while, on 
non-event days, the market return averages 0.03 percent. Therefore, we test for whether the 
negative event day returns are explained by asset pricing models, or represent unexplained, or 
abnormal returns.  
The empirical results presented in this paper add to the literature on the impact of 
financial crisis news and intervention announcements on the short-term stock price reactions in 
the financial markets. We show that financial crisis news significantly impacts the abnormal 
stock returns of most firms; however, such announcements have the least impact on large 
financial institutions, which actually achieve positive abnormal event interval returns. Positive 
abnormal portfolio returns for large financial firms in response to crisis event announcements are 
consistent with market perceptions of relatively lower risks for large financial institutions, 
despite the fact that many of these institutions were severely distressed, in part, due to the 
implicit understanding that the government would not allow the largest and most important 
financial institutions to fail. In addition, the negative impact of financial crisis event 
announcements on the real sector portfolios, especially those of small firms, illustrates the 
significant spillover effects that financial crisis news has on the returns of real sector stock 
returns and the importance of understanding and preventing financial crises. Finally, some 
individual events, such as the conversion of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs into holding 
companies and the government bailout of Citigroup are met with positive abnormal returns, as 
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large financial firms and policymakers attempted to dampen the crisis, indicating that regulatory 
and policy intervention can positively impact the targeted firms. Therefore, our results shed light 
on the stock price reactions to financial crisis news in the literature and provide insights to firm 
managers, investors, and policymakers. 
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